Konzepte und Erfahrungen der Geldpolitik
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Konzepte und Erfahrungen der Geldpolitik
Editors: Francke, Hans-Hermann | Ketzel, Eberhart
Beihefte zu / Supplements to »Kredit und Kapital«, Vol. 13
(1995)
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Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Inhalt | 5 | ||
Einführung | 9 | ||
I. Konzeptionelle Probleme | 19 | ||
Hans-Albert Leifer: „Banking-Prinzip" und „Umgekehrte Kausalität" Versuch einer Klarstellung | 21 | ||
I. | 21 | ||
II. | 21 | ||
III. | 25 | ||
IV. | 27 | ||
V. | 30 | ||
1. Currency-Prinzip | 30 | ||
2. Banking-Prinzip | 30 | ||
VI. | 31 | ||
VII. | 34 | ||
1. Die Geschäftssphäre | 34 | ||
2. Die Einkommenssphäre | 35 | ||
VIII. | 37 | ||
IX. | 39 | ||
X. | 40 | ||
Literatur | 41 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 43 | ||
Summary | 44 | ||
Résumé | 44 | ||
Meyer Burstein: The American Crisis 1929 - 1933 | 47 | ||
I. Introduction | 47 | ||
II. Historical Perspectives - Economic Thought | 47 | ||
III. Historical Perspectives - Economic Policy | 50 | ||
1. Keynes (1930) on the Intrinsic Flaws of the Federal Reserve System | 51 | ||
2. Reflections; the Perceived Flaws of the National Banking System , etc. | 52 | ||
a) Inelasticity of the Supply of Credit | 52 | ||
b) Imperfect Interconvertibility of Deposits and Currency | 53 | ||
c) Absence of a Perfected Acceptances Market in New York | 54 | ||
IV. The Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Temin (1976) Analyses | 55 | ||
V. A Model of Implosion of the Matrix of Claims: The Identification Problem Encore | 60 | ||
1. A First Approximation of the Model | 60 | ||
2. An Illustration Via a Matrix of Claims | 62 | ||
a) Comments on the Simplistic Matrix of Claims | 62 | ||
3. Another Version of my Model | 63 | ||
References | 63 | ||
Summary | 65 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 65 | ||
Résumé | 65 | ||
Andreas Fischer: Inflation Targeting in Canada and New Zealand | 67 | ||
I. Rationale for Targeting Inflation? | 69 | ||
1. Lowering Inflationary Expectations in the Private Sector | 70 | ||
2. Conditioning the Behavior and Government Spending | 71 | ||
3. Targeting Inflation Removes Discretionary Behavior | 72 | ||
4. Improving Accountability | 73 | ||
5. Insulating the Central Bank from Political Pressures | 73 | ||
II. Implementation of Inflation Targets | 74 | ||
1. Defining the Target Path | 74 | ||
2. Instruments , Targets and Operational Rules | 75 | ||
III. Evidence of Inflation Targeting in Canada and New Zealand | 77 | ||
1. The Target Path in Canada and New Zealand | 77 | ||
2. Undershooting the Intermediate Targets | 78 | ||
3. Do Inflation Targets Represent a Regime Change? | 79 | ||
4. New Zealand versus Australia | 81 | ||
5. Canada and the United States | 85 | ||
IV. Conclusions | 88 | ||
References | 88 | ||
Summary | 90 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 90 | ||
Résumé | 91 | ||
Norbert Funke: Das internationale nominale Sozialprodukt als geldpolitisches Koordinationsziel: Eine Analyse | 93 | ||
I. Einleitung | 93 | ||
II. Modelltheoretische Betrachtung | 96 | ||
1. Additives System | 99 | ||
2. Differenzensystem | 101 | ||
3. Schockauswirkungen auf das Inland und Ausland | 102 | ||
III. Unterschiedliche geldpolitische Zielgrößen | 108 | ||
IV. Schockauswirkungen in einem makroökonomischen Mehr-Regionen-Modell | 109 | ||
V. Koordinationsprobleme bei einer internationalen BSP-Regelpolitik | 111 | ||
VI. Fazit | 114 | ||
Anhang | 115 | ||
Literatur | 117 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 120 | ||
Summary | 120 | ||
Résumé | 121 | ||
Matthias Zieschang und Gisela Kubon-Gilke: Matthias Zieschang und Gisela Kubon-Gilke | 123 | ||
I. Einleitung | 123 | ||
II. Das Grundmodell | 125 | ||
III. Auswirkungen der Staatsausgabenerhöhung | 127 | ||
1. Finanzierung der Staatsausgabenerhöhung durch kurzfristige Wertpapiere | 131 | ||
2. Finanzierung der Staatsausgabenerhöhung durch Konsols | 133 | ||
IV. Schlußbemerkungen | 134 | ||
Literatur | 135 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 136 | ||
Summary | 136 | ||
Résumé | 136 | ||
II. Ordnung und Institutionen | 137 | ||
Hans G. Monissen: Monetäre Interdependenz von Zentralbanken bei endogenen Zielfunktionen | 139 | ||
I. Einführung | 139 | ||
II. Das Grundmodell | 141 | ||
III. Erweiterung des Modells auf zwei Länder | 145 | ||
IV. Strategien und Reaktionsfunktionen der Zentralbanken | 148 | ||
V. Indifferenzkurven der Zentralbanken | 155 | ||
VI. Einbeziehung eines positiven Angebotsschocks für das Inland | 157 | ||
VII. Zusammenfassung | 160 | ||
Literatur | 161 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 162 | ||
Summary | 162 | ||
Résumé | 162 | ||
Eduard Hochreiter and Georg Winckler: Signaling a Hard Currency Strategy: The Case of Austria | 163 | ||
I. Introduction | 163 | ||
II. Basic outline of the model | 165 | ||
1. The setup of the model | 165 | ||
2. The preferences of the players | 167 | ||
a) The trade union | 167 | ||
b) The central bank | 167 | ||
3. Analysis of the game | 168 | ||
4. Summary | 169 | ||
III. Some econometric results for Austria | 170 | ||
IV. A review of policy measures in Austria | 172 | ||
1. Policy considerations until the second oil price rise in early 1979 | 172 | ||
2. The revaluation of 1979 | 175 | ||
3. Conclusions | 177 | ||
V. The success of the 1980s | 177 | ||
References | 179 | ||
Summary | 184 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 184 | ||
Résumé | 184 | ||
Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling: Central Bank Independence: Criteria and Indices | 185 | ||
I. Introduction | 185 | ||
II. Indices of Central Bank Independence | 187 | ||
1. Bade and Parkin 's Courageous Attempt | 187 | ||
2. Alesina' s Amendation | 192 | ||
3. The Broad Index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini | 195 | ||
III. Towards a New Index of Policy Independence | 200 | ||
1. A New Index of Policy Independence | 200 | ||
2. Comparison with the Literature | 203 | ||
3. Indices of Central Bank Independence: an Evaluation | 206 | ||
IV. Central Bank Independence and Inflation | 207 | ||
1. Empirical Evidence on the Various Indices of Central Bank Independence | 207 | ||
2. Conclusion | 210 | ||
References | 215 | ||
Summary | 216 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 217 | ||
Résumé | 217 | ||
Ralf-Michael Marquardt: Eine ökonometrische Analyse zur preisstabilisierenden Wirkung des „alten EWS" | 219 | ||
I. Einleitung | 219 | ||
II. Vorgehensweise | 220 | ||
III. Stilisierte Fakten | 222 | ||
IV. Ökonometrische Analyse | 227 | ||
V. Fazit | 233 | ||
Anhang | 235 | ||
1. Zur Datengrundlage | 235 | ||
2. Störgrößentests | 236 | ||
3. Schätzverfahren | 236 | ||
Literatur | 237 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 239 | ||
Summary | 239 | ||
Résumé | 240 | ||
III. Geldmarkt und Zins | 241 | ||
Armin Rohde: Geldmarkt und Geldmarktsteuerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland | 243 | ||
I. Einführung | 243 | ||
II. Geldmarktabgrenzung | 243 | ||
III. Geldmarktgeschäfte | 245 | ||
IV. Zinsbildung am Geldmarkt | 245 | ||
V. Geldmarktsteuerungsstrategien | 249 | ||
1. Starre Geldmarktsteuerung | 249 | ||
2. Flexible Geldmarktsteuerung | 252 | ||
VI. Die flexible Geldmarktsteuerung 1988 - 1992 | 256 | ||
1. Die Zinsaufschwungphase 1988 - 1992 | 257 | ||
2. Die EWS-Turbulenzen im September 1992 | 259 | ||
VII. Abschließende Bemerkungen | 263 | ||
Literatur | 264 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 265 | ||
Summary | 265 | ||
Résumé | 266 | ||
Bas Β. Bakker and Jakob de Haan: The Term Structure of German Interest Rates | 267 | ||
I. Introduction | 267 | ||
II. Does the short-term interest rate have a unit root? | 268 | ||
III. Stationary short-term interest rates and the term structure | 271 | ||
IV. Conclusion | 274 | ||
References | 274 | ||
Summary | 275 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 275 | ||
Résumé | 276 | ||
Clemens J. M. Kool and Kees G. Koedijk: Uncovered Interest Parity and Economic Convergence in the EMS: An Evaluation | 277 | ||
I. Introduction | 277 | ||
II. Data | 279 | ||
III. Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity | 280 | ||
IV. Information in Changes in Bilateral Interest Differentials | 285 | ||
V. An Explanation: Past and Future | 293 | ||
1. Explaining Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity | 293 | ||
2. Extrapolation from Past to Future | 296 | ||
References | 297 | ||
Summary | 298 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 298 | ||
Résumé | 299 | ||
IV. Stabilisierung und Entwicklung | 301 | ||
Martin T. Bohl: Cagan-Modell und Kointegrationskonzept | 303 | ||
I. Einleitung | 303 | ||
II. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Cagans Geidnachfragefunktion und dem Kointegrationskonzept | 304 | ||
III. Verwendete Integrations- und Kointegrationstests | 307 | ||
IV. Empirische Ergebnisse | 310 | ||
V. Zusammenfassung | 318 | ||
Literatur | 319 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 321 | ||
Summary | 322 | ||
Résumé | 323 | ||
Helmut Zink: Stability Problems in Hyperinflation Models | 325 | ||
I. Introduction | 325 | ||
II. The effect of seigniorage financed fiscal deficit on inflation under exogenous payment schemes | 328 | ||
1. Assumptions | 328 | ||
2. Calculation of the inflation rate | 328 | ||
III. The effect of fiscal deficit on inflation under endogenous payment scheme | 329 | ||
1. Assumptions | 329 | ||
2. Optimal payment frequencies | 331 | ||
3. Stationary equilibria | 331 | ||
4. Stability properties for slow frequency adaptations | 332 | ||
5. Hyperinflation | 333 | ||
IV. Stability properties for bounded flexibility of payment frequencies | 334 | ||
1. Stepwise adaptation with unbounded flexibility of payment frequencies | 335 | ||
2. Stepwise adaptation with bounded flexibility of payment frequencies | 336 | ||
3. Stepwise adaptation with bounded flexibility of payment frequencies and conditionally rational expectations | 341 | ||
4. Stability analysis without linearization procedures | 343 | ||
V. Conclusions | 345 | ||
References | 346 | ||
Appendix 1: An explanation of monitoring cost | 347 | ||
Appendix 2: Calculation of the optimal payment frequency | 348 | ||
Appendix 3: Stability properties under conditionally rational expectations | 352 | ||
Summary | 355 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 355 | ||
Résumé | 355 | ||
Friedrich L. Seil: Preisniveaustabilität in Entwicklungsländern: Luxus oder Notwendigkeit? | 357 | ||
I. Einleitung | 357 | ||
II. Geldwertstabilität und Entwicklung: Inflation als Entwicklungshemmnis? | 359 | ||
III. Geldwertstabilität und Entwicklung: eine Querschnittsbetrachtung | 360 | ||
IV. Ein modifiziertes Tobin-Johnson-Modell für wirtschaftliches Wachstum in Entwicklungsländern | 364 | ||
1. Der erklärungsbedürftige empirische Befund | 364 | ||
2. Modellstruktur nach Tobin und Gylfason | 365 | ||
3. Modellstruktur nach Tobin und McKinnon | 368 | ||
4. Modellstruktur nach Tobin und Moore | 369 | ||
5. Ergebnisse der Modellanalyse | 370 | ||
V. Fazit | 372 | ||
Literatur | 374 | ||
Mathematischer Anhang | 376 | ||
1. Gylfason - Tobin | 376 | ||
2. McKinnon-Tobin | 379 | ||
3. Moore-Tobin | 380 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 380 | ||
Summary | 381 | ||
Résumé | 381 | ||
Hans-Georg Petersen and Christoph Sowada: The Polish Success in Monetary Stabilization | 383 | ||
I. Introduction | 383 | ||
II. How to Define Inflation? | 384 | ||
III. Combating Inflation - Some Historical Remarks and the Polish Example | 386 | ||
IV. The Monetarist Approach to the Polish Inflation | 392 | ||
V. Capital Markets, Interest Rates, and the Budgetary Situation | 397 | ||
VI. Conclusion | 407 | ||
Literature | 408 | ||
Summary | 409 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 409 | ||
Résumé | 410 | ||
Dimitris A. Georgoutsos, Athens, and Georgios P. Kouretas: Testing Long-Run Equilibrium Relationships Between Exchange Rates and Prices | 413 | ||
I. Introduction | 413 | ||
II. Methodological Issues | 414 | ||
III. Empirical Evidence | 416 | ||
IV. Concluding Remarks | 421 | ||
References | 429 | ||
Summary | 429 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 430 | ||
Résumé | 431 | ||
John M. Paleologos and Spiros E. Georgantelis: The Rational Expectations Approach to the Study of Consumption - Income Dynamics: The Case of Greece 1953 - 1988 | 433 | ||
I. Introduction | 433 | ||
II. The Rational Expectations - Permanent Income Hypothesis (RE-PIH) | 434 | ||
III. Data Used | 437 | ||
IV. Empirical Results | 437 | ||
Bibliography | 446 | ||
Summary | 447 | ||
Zusammenfassung | 448 | ||
Résumé | 449 | ||
Verzeichnis der Autoren | 451 |