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Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts

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Krawietz, W., Martino, A., Winston, K. (Eds.) (1991). Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts. Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0
Krawietz, Werner; Martino, Antonio A. and Winston, Kenneth I.. Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts: Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka. Duncker & Humblot, 1991. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0
Krawietz, W, Martino, A, Winston, K (eds.) (1991): Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts: Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0

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Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts

Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka

Editors: Krawietz, Werner | Martino, Antonio A. | Winston, Kenneth I.

Rechtstheorie. Beihefte, Vol. 11

(1991)

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Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Editorisches Vorwort V
Editorial Preface VII
Preface IX
Inhaltsverzeichnis XIII
I. Recht als technischer Imperativ 1
Aulis Aarnio, Helsinki: TECHNICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW 3
References 10
Carla Faralli, Bologna: THE CONCEPT OF LAW ACCORDING TO DEWEY’S PRAGMATIC INSTRUMENTALISM 11
Stig Jørgensen, Aarhus: THE LIMITS OF LAW 23
Preface 23
I. Biology and Society 23
II. Psychology and Society 26
III. Idea and Society 29
IV. Language and Society 32
V. Law and Society 37
VI. Conclusions 40
Niklas Luhmann, Bielefeld: DER URSPRUNG DES EIGENTUMS UND SEINE LEGITIMATION. Ein historischer Bericht 43
I. 43
II. 44
III. 48
IV. 50
V. 51
VI. 54
Kaarlo Tuori, Helsinki: GOAL-ORIENTED LEGISLATION AND THE GENERAL DOCTRINES OF PUBLIC LAW 59
I. 59
II. 59
III. 65
Rüdiger Voigt, Siegen: LAW AS A MEDIUM OF POLITICAL REGULATION 67
I. Law as a Medium of Regulation 67
II. Types of Legal Regulation 68
III. Structural Coupling of Different Systems 69
IV. Implementation as a Problem of Coupling 70
1. Situative Administration 70
2. Bargaining Systems 71
3. Structural Overcharging 72
V. Strategies of a New Type of Regulation 73
1. Decentralization 74
2. Flexibilization 74
3. Regulation of Self-Referential Systems 75
VI. Programs of Relationalization 76
VII. Cultural Regulation 76
References 79
G. Gregory Washington, Georgetown: INTRASOCIETAL AND INTERSOCIETAL MORAL VALUES AND THE MORAL LEADER IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE. Comments on Henri Bergson 81
II. Moralische Prinzipien, Rechtsregeln und individuelle Freiheit 89
Yoshikazu Aihara, Tokyo: LEGITIMITÄT, ORTHODOXIE UND RICHTIGKEIT IM ‚BUCH VON DER WAHREN GOTT-KAISER-HERRSCHAFTS-LINIE‘ (JINNÔ-SHÔTÔ-KI) 91
Theodore M. Benditt, Birmingham: LIBERAL MORALITY 101
I. The Liberal Conception of Morality 102
II. Morality is Not Just Interpersonal 102
III. Ideals 104
IV. Liberalism in Morality 107
John G. Cottingham, Reading: RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT, THE MORAL ORDER AND DETERMINISM 111
I. The Onus of Justification 112
II. The Ascending Scale of Response 114
III. Retribution and Determinism 116
Conrad D. Johnson, Maryland: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE MORAL NORMS: TWO MODELS 119
I. 119
II. 121
III. 123
C. W. Maris, Amsterdam: CULTURAL AND ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS UNIVERSALISM IN MODERN LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY 125
I. Introduction 125
II. Logical Atomism and Positivism 126
III. Post-Positivism 127
IV. Winch: Social Science 130
V. Winch: Cultural Relativism 131
VI. Winch: Ethical Relativism 132
VII. Apel: Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of the Sciences 134
IX. Apel and Winch 138
X. Apel and Winch: Conclusions 140
XI. Conclusion 145
References 148
Aleksander Peczenik, Lund: LEGAL RULES AND MORAL PRINCIPLES 151
I. Rules, Principles and Values 151
II. Prima-Facie Character of Principles 152
III. Weighing and Balancing of Principles 153
IV. Weighing the Morally Good 156
V. Prima-Facie Obligation To Follow the Prima-Facie Law 159
VI. All-Things-Considered Moral Obligation to Follow the All-Things-Considered Law 161
VII. The Right to Resist Oppression 164
Ota Weinberger, Graz: DAS WESEN DER REGELN 169
Einleitung 169
I. ‚Regel‘ ist ein praktischer (handlungsrelativer) Begriff 170
II. Regeln können sowohl in individueller als auch in gesellschaftlicher Perspektive wirksam sein 171
III. Drei semantische Typen von Regeln 171
IV. Regeln sind auch faktentranszendent anwendbar 172
V. Wie bestimmen kognitive Regeln die Durchführung von Erkenntnisaufgaben? 173
VI. Technologische Regeln sind Handlungsprogramme 174
VII. Verschiedene Kategorien normativer Regeln 175
VIII. Der Unterschied zwischen Verhaltens- und Ermächtigungsnormen 175
IX. Betrachtungen über normative Operatoren 179
X. Grundsätze sind eine besondere Art normativer Regeln 182
XI. Searles Gegenüberstellung von konstitutiven und regulativen Regeln 183
XII. Normative Regeln können rational gerechtfertigt werden. Die Universalisierung ist aber keine selbständige Rechtfertigungsmethode 185
XIII. Normative Regeln als Basis von Pflichten und Rechten, von Werturteilen sowie von Erwartungen der Menschen und der Handlungsmöglichkeiten im Rahmen von Institutionen 187
XIV. Die gesellschaftliche Existenz normativer Regeln beruht auf deren Integration in eine tatsächlich bestehende gesellschaftliche Institution 190
Jerzy Wróblewski †, Łódź: LAW AND SOCIETY: BASIC PROBLEMS OF LEGAL AXIOLOGY 193
I. Introductory Observations 193
II. Legal Axiology 193
III. Social Groups and Society 195
IV. Law and Society Relation: a Sociological Perspective 196
V. Law and Society Relations: an Axiological Perspective 198
VI. Axiological Problems of Global Society and the Law 200
VII. Axiological Problems of the Supra-Global Society and the Law 202
VIII. Conclusions: Basic Problems of Legal Axiology 203
References 204
III. Recht und Gerechtigkeit als Vertrag 207
Tom D. Campbell, Glasgow: JUSTICE AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT 209
References 214
Robert C. L. Moffat, Gainesville: IMPLICIT PROMISE KEEPING AND FULLER’S INTERNAL MORALITY OF LAW 215
I. The Morality of Role and Implicit Promise Keeping 217
II. The Role of Lawgiver and Its Implicit Promises 219
Kouji Nakamura, Osaka: THE IDEOLOGICAL MEANING OF ‘JAPANESE COLLECTIVISM’ AND ‘SOFT INDIVIDUALISM’. The Reception of Individualism in Japan 223
I. An Analysis of “Japanese Collectivism” 223
1. “Holonic-Path” and “Japanese Collectivism” 223
2. About the Term “Japanese Collectivism” 225
3. “Japanese Collectivism” = Contextualism 226
4. Logic of Internationalization in “Japanese Collectivism” 227
II. Soft-Individualism 227
1. Holonic-Path and Soft-Individualism 227
2. On the Theoretical Background of “Soft-Individualism” 228
3. “Soft-Individualism” 228
4. A Question About the Japanese Character 230
III. Restoration of “Hard-Individualism” 231
Andras Sajó, Budapest: BARGAINED LAW: HIGH-RISK HIGH-TECH REGULATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW 233
I. 233
II. 240
III. 245
References 246
Ching Lai Sheng, Taipei: COMMENTS ON RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AS A CRITERION FOR DISTRIBUTION 249
I. Introduction 249
II. Obscurity of John Rawls’ Difference Principle 249
1. Nature of the Dimensions of X1 and X2 in Fig. 1 251
2. Nature of Curve OP 252
a) Interpretation of OP As a Changing Situation 252
b) Interpretation of OP As Various Distribution Situations 253
III. The Difference Principle As a Criterion for Distribution 254
1. Applied to Changing Situations of an Action or Simply a Single Action 254
2. Applied to Various Distribution Schemes 255
3. Applied to Various Results of Economic Growth 258
IV. Concluding Remarks 259
IV. Autopoiese und Reproduktion von Rechtssystemen 261
André-Jean Arnaud, Paris: RAISING SOME PROBLEMS ON THE CLOSURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 263
I. The Closure of a System and the Subject of “Law” 263
1. The Lawyer, the Sociologist and the Semiotician 264
2. The Double Normative Nature of the Law 265
II. Closure of the System and Autonomy of the Law 268
1. Relations between Systems 268
2. Relations inside Systems 274
References 277
Alejo de Cervera, Puerto Rico: OF THE BEGINNINGS OF SOVEREIGN GROUPS 279
I. The Situation At The Starting Moment 281
II. Some Emigrations Begin as Well as the Effort to Know of Them 284
1. Patterns of Behavior and Incumbency 284
2. Vinculum, Normative Thought, Normative Proposition 284
3. The All-Embracing Natural Order of Things 284
4. Compulsion, Repression, Punishment, Repetition 285
5. The Group 285
6. The Immutability Thesis 286
7. Justice, Injustice, and Strivings for Change 287
8. Individuality 288
9. Other Groups, Sovereignty 289
10. The Norms 289
Tōru Hijikata, Saitama: DAS SICH ENTWICKELNDE SYSTEM. Die universale Theorie in den gegenwärtigen Wissenschaften 291
I. 291
II. 292
III. 293
IV. 294
V. 294
VI. 295
Ernst M. H. Hirsch Ballin, Tilburg: CONNECTIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND PROFESSIONAL CODES. The Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments 297
I. Introduction 297
II. Analysis 299
III. Integration of Professional Standards into the Legal System 300
IV. Legal Systems and Professional Codes 302
Csaba Varga, Budapest: JUDICIAL REPRODUCTION OF THE LAW IN AN AUTOPOIETICAL SYSTEM? 305
References 312
V. Legal Expert Systems 315
Carlo Biagioli, Firenze: DEFINITIONAL ELEMENTS OF A LANGUAGE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF STATUTORY TEXTS 317
I. Artificial Intelligence and the Law 317
II. Towards a Legally and Linguistically Based Theory for the Representation of Statutory Knowledge 319
III. Functional Specialization of Statutory Linguistic Acts 320
1. Secondary Rules 321
2. Primary Rules 322
a) Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules 322
b) Procedural Rules 326
c) Behavioural Rules and Rules for Regulating Behaviour 326
IV. Criteria for Evaluating Functional Types 328
V. Formalization of Statutory Texts 330
1. Towards a Model of Functional Types 330
2. Functional Types and A. I. Models 332
VI. Conclusion 333
Jes Bjarup, Aarhus: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN LIFE. A Vital Question for Jurisprudence 337
I. Introduction 337
II. The Problems of Human Genetic Engineering – Scientific and Moral Thinking 338
III. Human Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem 340
IV. Solutions of Human Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem 341
V. The Danish Solution 343
VI. Morality and the Law 346
VII. The Danish Statute concerning Biomedical Research – A Moral Criticism 347
VIII. Conclusion 351
Wolfgang Kilian, Hannover: AUSWIRKUNGEN DER INFORMATIONSTECHNOLOGIE AUF RECHTLICHE PRINZIPIEN 353
I. Ziel und Methode der Ausführungen 353
1. Definition „Informationstechnologie“ 353
2. Definition „rechtliche Prinzipien“ 353
II. Erscheinungsformen der Informationstechnologie 354
III. Informationstechnologie und Freiheit der Person 355
1. Vertragsfreiheit 356
2. Freiheit der Person 356
IV. Informationstechnologie und Gewährleistung des Eigentums 359
V. Informationstechnologie und Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz 360
1. Telearbeit 360
2. Verwaltungsautomation 361
VI. Informationstechnologie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit 361
VII. Informationstechnologie und nationale Souveränität 362
VIII. Zukunftsaufgaben 364
Lester J. Mazor, Amherst: LAW AND THE VELOCITY OF INFORMATION 365
References 371
Theodore Waldman, Claremont: SOME BENEFICIAL AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY UPON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. A Study in Social Philosophy 373
Mitsukuni Yasaki, Tokyo: CAN AND SHOULD THE LAW RESPOND TO OUR SOCIETY’S TECHNOLOGICAL NEEDS? 381
I. Ambivalence of our Way of Life 381
II. The Problem of Modernization as a Converging Point of “National” and “Internationalization” 381
III. The Problem of “Surface” and “Bottom” in the Development of Society 382
IV. The Problem of “Consensus” as a Convenient Tool of Persuasion 384
Mitarbeiterverzeichnis (einschl. des Beirats der Herausgeber) 389
Beiträge des 13. Weltkongresses für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Kobe / Japan Gesamtverzeichnis 392
1. Verlag Duncker & Humblot: Beihefte zu RECHTSTHEORIE, 1991 392
2. Verlag Franz Steiner Wiesbaden GmbH: Beihefte zum ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, 1991 393