Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts
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Krawietz, W., Martino, A., Winston, K. (Eds.) (1991). Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts. Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0
Krawietz, Werner; Martino, Antonio A. and Winston, Kenneth I.. Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts: Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka. Duncker & Humblot, 1991. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0
Krawietz, W, Martino, A, Winston, K (eds.) (1991): Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts: Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-47185-0
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Technischer Imperativ und Legitimationskrise des Rechts
Technical Imperatives and the Crisis of the Legitimacy of Law. Vorwort von / Preface by Eugene Kamenka
Editors: Krawietz, Werner | Martino, Antonio A. | Winston, Kenneth I.
Rechtstheorie. Beihefte, Vol. 11
(1991)
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Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Editorisches Vorwort | V | ||
| Editorial Preface | VII | ||
| Preface | IX | ||
| Inhaltsverzeichnis | XIII | ||
| I. Recht als technischer Imperativ | 1 | ||
| Aulis Aarnio, Helsinki: TECHNICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW | 3 | ||
| References | 10 | ||
| Carla Faralli, Bologna: THE CONCEPT OF LAW ACCORDING TO DEWEY’S PRAGMATIC INSTRUMENTALISM | 11 | ||
| Stig Jørgensen, Aarhus: THE LIMITS OF LAW | 23 | ||
| Preface | 23 | ||
| I. Biology and Society | 23 | ||
| II. Psychology and Society | 26 | ||
| III. Idea and Society | 29 | ||
| IV. Language and Society | 32 | ||
| V. Law and Society | 37 | ||
| VI. Conclusions | 40 | ||
| Niklas Luhmann, Bielefeld: DER URSPRUNG DES EIGENTUMS UND SEINE LEGITIMATION. Ein historischer Bericht | 43 | ||
| I. | 43 | ||
| II. | 44 | ||
| III. | 48 | ||
| IV. | 50 | ||
| V. | 51 | ||
| VI. | 54 | ||
| Kaarlo Tuori, Helsinki: GOAL-ORIENTED LEGISLATION AND THE GENERAL DOCTRINES OF PUBLIC LAW | 59 | ||
| I. | 59 | ||
| II. | 59 | ||
| III. | 65 | ||
| Rüdiger Voigt, Siegen: LAW AS A MEDIUM OF POLITICAL REGULATION | 67 | ||
| I. Law as a Medium of Regulation | 67 | ||
| II. Types of Legal Regulation | 68 | ||
| III. Structural Coupling of Different Systems | 69 | ||
| IV. Implementation as a Problem of Coupling | 70 | ||
| 1. Situative Administration | 70 | ||
| 2. Bargaining Systems | 71 | ||
| 3. Structural Overcharging | 72 | ||
| V. Strategies of a New Type of Regulation | 73 | ||
| 1. Decentralization | 74 | ||
| 2. Flexibilization | 74 | ||
| 3. Regulation of Self-Referential Systems | 75 | ||
| VI. Programs of Relationalization | 76 | ||
| VII. Cultural Regulation | 76 | ||
| References | 79 | ||
| G. Gregory Washington, Georgetown: INTRASOCIETAL AND INTERSOCIETAL MORAL VALUES AND THE MORAL LEADER IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE. Comments on Henri Bergson | 81 | ||
| II. Moralische Prinzipien, Rechtsregeln und individuelle Freiheit | 89 | ||
| Yoshikazu Aihara, Tokyo: LEGITIMITÄT, ORTHODOXIE UND RICHTIGKEIT IM ‚BUCH VON DER WAHREN GOTT-KAISER-HERRSCHAFTS-LINIE‘ (JINNÔ-SHÔTÔ-KI) | 91 | ||
| Theodore M. Benditt, Birmingham: LIBERAL MORALITY | 101 | ||
| I. The Liberal Conception of Morality | 102 | ||
| II. Morality is Not Just Interpersonal | 102 | ||
| III. Ideals | 104 | ||
| IV. Liberalism in Morality | 107 | ||
| John G. Cottingham, Reading: RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT, THE MORAL ORDER AND DETERMINISM | 111 | ||
| I. The Onus of Justification | 112 | ||
| II. The Ascending Scale of Response | 114 | ||
| III. Retribution and Determinism | 116 | ||
| Conrad D. Johnson, Maryland: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE MORAL NORMS: TWO MODELS | 119 | ||
| I. | 119 | ||
| II. | 121 | ||
| III. | 123 | ||
| C. W. Maris, Amsterdam: CULTURAL AND ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS UNIVERSALISM IN MODERN LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY | 125 | ||
| I. Introduction | 125 | ||
| II. Logical Atomism and Positivism | 126 | ||
| III. Post-Positivism | 127 | ||
| IV. Winch: Social Science | 130 | ||
| V. Winch: Cultural Relativism | 131 | ||
| VI. Winch: Ethical Relativism | 132 | ||
| VII. Apel: Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of the Sciences | 134 | ||
| IX. Apel and Winch | 138 | ||
| X. Apel and Winch: Conclusions | 140 | ||
| XI. Conclusion | 145 | ||
| References | 148 | ||
| Aleksander Peczenik, Lund: LEGAL RULES AND MORAL PRINCIPLES | 151 | ||
| I. Rules, Principles and Values | 151 | ||
| II. Prima-Facie Character of Principles | 152 | ||
| III. Weighing and Balancing of Principles | 153 | ||
| IV. Weighing the Morally Good | 156 | ||
| V. Prima-Facie Obligation To Follow the Prima-Facie Law | 159 | ||
| VI. All-Things-Considered Moral Obligation to Follow the All-Things-Considered Law | 161 | ||
| VII. The Right to Resist Oppression | 164 | ||
| Ota Weinberger, Graz: DAS WESEN DER REGELN | 169 | ||
| Einleitung | 169 | ||
| I. ‚Regel‘ ist ein praktischer (handlungsrelativer) Begriff | 170 | ||
| II. Regeln können sowohl in individueller als auch in gesellschaftlicher Perspektive wirksam sein | 171 | ||
| III. Drei semantische Typen von Regeln | 171 | ||
| IV. Regeln sind auch faktentranszendent anwendbar | 172 | ||
| V. Wie bestimmen kognitive Regeln die Durchführung von Erkenntnisaufgaben? | 173 | ||
| VI. Technologische Regeln sind Handlungsprogramme | 174 | ||
| VII. Verschiedene Kategorien normativer Regeln | 175 | ||
| VIII. Der Unterschied zwischen Verhaltens- und Ermächtigungsnormen | 175 | ||
| IX. Betrachtungen über normative Operatoren | 179 | ||
| X. Grundsätze sind eine besondere Art normativer Regeln | 182 | ||
| XI. Searles Gegenüberstellung von konstitutiven und regulativen Regeln | 183 | ||
| XII. Normative Regeln können rational gerechtfertigt werden. Die Universalisierung ist aber keine selbständige Rechtfertigungsmethode | 185 | ||
| XIII. Normative Regeln als Basis von Pflichten und Rechten, von Werturteilen sowie von Erwartungen der Menschen und der Handlungsmöglichkeiten im Rahmen von Institutionen | 187 | ||
| XIV. Die gesellschaftliche Existenz normativer Regeln beruht auf deren Integration in eine tatsächlich bestehende gesellschaftliche Institution | 190 | ||
| Jerzy Wróblewski †, Łódź: LAW AND SOCIETY: BASIC PROBLEMS OF LEGAL AXIOLOGY | 193 | ||
| I. Introductory Observations | 193 | ||
| II. Legal Axiology | 193 | ||
| III. Social Groups and Society | 195 | ||
| IV. Law and Society Relation: a Sociological Perspective | 196 | ||
| V. Law and Society Relations: an Axiological Perspective | 198 | ||
| VI. Axiological Problems of Global Society and the Law | 200 | ||
| VII. Axiological Problems of the Supra-Global Society and the Law | 202 | ||
| VIII. Conclusions: Basic Problems of Legal Axiology | 203 | ||
| References | 204 | ||
| III. Recht und Gerechtigkeit als Vertrag | 207 | ||
| Tom D. Campbell, Glasgow: JUSTICE AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT | 209 | ||
| References | 214 | ||
| Robert C. L. Moffat, Gainesville: IMPLICIT PROMISE KEEPING AND FULLER’S INTERNAL MORALITY OF LAW | 215 | ||
| I. The Morality of Role and Implicit Promise Keeping | 217 | ||
| II. The Role of Lawgiver and Its Implicit Promises | 219 | ||
| Kouji Nakamura, Osaka: THE IDEOLOGICAL MEANING OF ‘JAPANESE COLLECTIVISM’ AND ‘SOFT INDIVIDUALISM’. The Reception of Individualism in Japan | 223 | ||
| I. An Analysis of “Japanese Collectivism” | 223 | ||
| 1. “Holonic-Path” and “Japanese Collectivism” | 223 | ||
| 2. About the Term “Japanese Collectivism” | 225 | ||
| 3. “Japanese Collectivism” = Contextualism | 226 | ||
| 4. Logic of Internationalization in “Japanese Collectivism” | 227 | ||
| II. Soft-Individualism | 227 | ||
| 1. Holonic-Path and Soft-Individualism | 227 | ||
| 2. On the Theoretical Background of “Soft-Individualism” | 228 | ||
| 3. “Soft-Individualism” | 228 | ||
| 4. A Question About the Japanese Character | 230 | ||
| III. Restoration of “Hard-Individualism” | 231 | ||
| Andras Sajó, Budapest: BARGAINED LAW: HIGH-RISK HIGH-TECH REGULATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW | 233 | ||
| I. | 233 | ||
| II. | 240 | ||
| III. | 245 | ||
| References | 246 | ||
| Ching Lai Sheng, Taipei: COMMENTS ON RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AS A CRITERION FOR DISTRIBUTION | 249 | ||
| I. Introduction | 249 | ||
| II. Obscurity of John Rawls’ Difference Principle | 249 | ||
| 1. Nature of the Dimensions of X1 and X2 in Fig. 1 | 251 | ||
| 2. Nature of Curve OP | 252 | ||
| a) Interpretation of OP As a Changing Situation | 252 | ||
| b) Interpretation of OP As Various Distribution Situations | 253 | ||
| III. The Difference Principle As a Criterion for Distribution | 254 | ||
| 1. Applied to Changing Situations of an Action or Simply a Single Action | 254 | ||
| 2. Applied to Various Distribution Schemes | 255 | ||
| 3. Applied to Various Results of Economic Growth | 258 | ||
| IV. Concluding Remarks | 259 | ||
| IV. Autopoiese und Reproduktion von Rechtssystemen | 261 | ||
| André-Jean Arnaud, Paris: RAISING SOME PROBLEMS ON THE CLOSURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM | 263 | ||
| I. The Closure of a System and the Subject of “Law” | 263 | ||
| 1. The Lawyer, the Sociologist and the Semiotician | 264 | ||
| 2. The Double Normative Nature of the Law | 265 | ||
| II. Closure of the System and Autonomy of the Law | 268 | ||
| 1. Relations between Systems | 268 | ||
| 2. Relations inside Systems | 274 | ||
| References | 277 | ||
| Alejo de Cervera, Puerto Rico: OF THE BEGINNINGS OF SOVEREIGN GROUPS | 279 | ||
| I. The Situation At The Starting Moment | 281 | ||
| II. Some Emigrations Begin as Well as the Effort to Know of Them | 284 | ||
| 1. Patterns of Behavior and Incumbency | 284 | ||
| 2. Vinculum, Normative Thought, Normative Proposition | 284 | ||
| 3. The All-Embracing Natural Order of Things | 284 | ||
| 4. Compulsion, Repression, Punishment, Repetition | 285 | ||
| 5. The Group | 285 | ||
| 6. The Immutability Thesis | 286 | ||
| 7. Justice, Injustice, and Strivings for Change | 287 | ||
| 8. Individuality | 288 | ||
| 9. Other Groups, Sovereignty | 289 | ||
| 10. The Norms | 289 | ||
| Tōru Hijikata, Saitama: DAS SICH ENTWICKELNDE SYSTEM. Die universale Theorie in den gegenwärtigen Wissenschaften | 291 | ||
| I. | 291 | ||
| II. | 292 | ||
| III. | 293 | ||
| IV. | 294 | ||
| V. | 294 | ||
| VI. | 295 | ||
| Ernst M. H. Hirsch Ballin, Tilburg: CONNECTIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND PROFESSIONAL CODES. The Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments | 297 | ||
| I. Introduction | 297 | ||
| II. Analysis | 299 | ||
| III. Integration of Professional Standards into the Legal System | 300 | ||
| IV. Legal Systems and Professional Codes | 302 | ||
| Csaba Varga, Budapest: JUDICIAL REPRODUCTION OF THE LAW IN AN AUTOPOIETICAL SYSTEM? | 305 | ||
| References | 312 | ||
| V. Legal Expert Systems | 315 | ||
| Carlo Biagioli, Firenze: DEFINITIONAL ELEMENTS OF A LANGUAGE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF STATUTORY TEXTS | 317 | ||
| I. Artificial Intelligence and the Law | 317 | ||
| II. Towards a Legally and Linguistically Based Theory for the Representation of Statutory Knowledge | 319 | ||
| III. Functional Specialization of Statutory Linguistic Acts | 320 | ||
| 1. Secondary Rules | 321 | ||
| 2. Primary Rules | 322 | ||
| a) Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules | 322 | ||
| b) Procedural Rules | 326 | ||
| c) Behavioural Rules and Rules for Regulating Behaviour | 326 | ||
| IV. Criteria for Evaluating Functional Types | 328 | ||
| V. Formalization of Statutory Texts | 330 | ||
| 1. Towards a Model of Functional Types | 330 | ||
| 2. Functional Types and A. I. Models | 332 | ||
| VI. Conclusion | 333 | ||
| Jes Bjarup, Aarhus: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN LIFE. A Vital Question for Jurisprudence | 337 | ||
| I. Introduction | 337 | ||
| II. The Problems of Human Genetic Engineering – Scientific and Moral Thinking | 338 | ||
| III. Human Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem | 340 | ||
| IV. Solutions of Human Genetic Engineering as a Social Problem | 341 | ||
| V. The Danish Solution | 343 | ||
| VI. Morality and the Law | 346 | ||
| VII. The Danish Statute concerning Biomedical Research – A Moral Criticism | 347 | ||
| VIII. Conclusion | 351 | ||
| Wolfgang Kilian, Hannover: AUSWIRKUNGEN DER INFORMATIONSTECHNOLOGIE AUF RECHTLICHE PRINZIPIEN | 353 | ||
| I. Ziel und Methode der Ausführungen | 353 | ||
| 1. Definition „Informationstechnologie“ | 353 | ||
| 2. Definition „rechtliche Prinzipien“ | 353 | ||
| II. Erscheinungsformen der Informationstechnologie | 354 | ||
| III. Informationstechnologie und Freiheit der Person | 355 | ||
| 1. Vertragsfreiheit | 356 | ||
| 2. Freiheit der Person | 356 | ||
| IV. Informationstechnologie und Gewährleistung des Eigentums | 359 | ||
| V. Informationstechnologie und Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz | 360 | ||
| 1. Telearbeit | 360 | ||
| 2. Verwaltungsautomation | 361 | ||
| VI. Informationstechnologie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit | 361 | ||
| VII. Informationstechnologie und nationale Souveränität | 362 | ||
| VIII. Zukunftsaufgaben | 364 | ||
| Lester J. Mazor, Amherst: LAW AND THE VELOCITY OF INFORMATION | 365 | ||
| References | 371 | ||
| Theodore Waldman, Claremont: SOME BENEFICIAL AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY UPON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. A Study in Social Philosophy | 373 | ||
| Mitsukuni Yasaki, Tokyo: CAN AND SHOULD THE LAW RESPOND TO OUR SOCIETY’S TECHNOLOGICAL NEEDS? | 381 | ||
| I. Ambivalence of our Way of Life | 381 | ||
| II. The Problem of Modernization as a Converging Point of “National” and “Internationalization” | 381 | ||
| III. The Problem of “Surface” and “Bottom” in the Development of Society | 382 | ||
| IV. The Problem of “Consensus” as a Convenient Tool of Persuasion | 384 | ||
| Mitarbeiterverzeichnis (einschl. des Beirats der Herausgeber) | 389 | ||
| Beiträge des 13. Weltkongresses für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Kobe / Japan Gesamtverzeichnis | 392 | ||
| 1. Verlag Duncker & Humblot: Beihefte zu RECHTSTHEORIE, 1991 | 392 | ||
| 2. Verlag Franz Steiner Wiesbaden GmbH: Beihefte zum ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, 1991 | 393 |