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Villanueva Breulmann, I. (2021). Peer Disagreement in Law. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-55928-2
Villanueva Breulmann, Isabell. Peer Disagreement in Law. Duncker & Humblot, 2021. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-55928-2
Villanueva Breulmann, I (2021): Peer Disagreement in Law, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-55928-2
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Peer Disagreement in Law
Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Vol. 295
(2021)
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About The Author
Isabell Villanueva studierte Rechtswissenschaften, Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte an der Universität Trier, der Universidad de Sevilla, der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster und der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. Von 2013 bis 2018 promovierte sie als Elsa-Neumann- und Caroline von Humboldt-Stipendiatin bei Prof. Dr. Keil und Prof. Dr. Christoph Möllers zu »Peer Disagreement in Law« mit einem zweieinhalbjährigen Forschungsaufenthalt an der New York University und Columbia University in den USA unter der Betreuung von Paul Boghossian und Joseph Raz. Seit 2019 ist sie als Richterin in Berlin tätig.Abstract
Philosophers have been puzzled for quite some time by the fact that intelligent and generally reasonable individuals who are equally well-informed and familiar with the same bodies of evidence still disagree with one another. Legal theorists wonder why this is puzzling for philosophers in the first place as disagreement is the very foundation of their work. This book, placed at the intersection of philosophical epistemology and jurisprudence, deals with the theoretical challenges that disagreements between judges create. The philosophical debate is applied to German and American legal disputes. How can such disagreements be integrated into the general philosophical debate on »peer disagreement« and into the legal theory of judicial decisionmaking? How should one deal with such disagreements under the existing legal framework but also in terms of legal policy?
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acknowledgements | 5 | ||
| Contents | 7 | ||
| I. Introduction | 11 | ||
| 1. Peer Disagreement in Law | 13 | ||
| 2. Deep Disagreements | 15 | ||
| 3. Chapter Summary | 15 | ||
| 4. Limitations | 16 | ||
| II. Supreme Court: Hobby Lobby | 17 | ||
| 1. The Battle for Universal Health Care | 17 | ||
| 2. The Hobby Lobby Case | 18 | ||
| a) Oral Argument | 19 | ||
| b) The Decision | 20 | ||
| c) Summary of Decision Grounds | 20 | ||
| 3. The Disagreements Involved in the Hobby Lobby Case | 21 | ||
| 4. The Disagreements in Detail | 23 | ||
| a) Are Closely Held Corporations Persons under the RFRA? | 23 | ||
| b) Can Closely Held For-Profit Corporations Engage in Religious Exercise? | 24 | ||
| c) Does the Contraceptive Mandate Substantially Burden the Exercise of Religion? | 25 | ||
| d) Is the Mandate the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a Compelling Governmental Interest? | 27 | ||
| e) What Are the Consequences of the Decision for Similar Cases? | 28 | ||
| 5. Overview of the Sources of Disagreement | 29 | ||
| 6. Analysis Disagreements | 30 | ||
| a) Closely Held Corporations as Persons Exercising Religion under the RFRA | 30 | ||
| b) Contraceptive Mandate as a Substantial Burden to the Exercise of Religion | 34 | ||
| c) Mandate as the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering Compelling Interest | 37 | ||
| d) Consequences of the Decision | 40 | ||
| 7. The Contraception Mandate Debate: Deep Disagreements | 41 | ||
| III. Bundesverfassungsgericht: Incest | 44 | ||
| 1. Incest and the Criminal Law | 44 | ||
| a) Occurrence of Incest | 45 | ||
| b) Contested Ban | 45 | ||
| 2. The Incest Case | 48 | ||
| a) The decision | 49 | ||
| b) Summary of Decision Grounds | 49 | ||
| 3. The Disagreements Involved in Incest | 50 | ||
| 4. Disagreements in Detail | 52 | ||
| a) What Were the Legislature’s Objectives When Enacting the Statute? | 52 | ||
| b) Can These Objectives Justify a Criminal Provision? | 54 | ||
| c) Is the Provision an Adequate Means to Foster the Desired Objectives? | 55 | ||
| d) Do as Effective but Less Restrictive Means Exist? | 57 | ||
| e) Is § 173.2 Sentence 2 StGB Proportionate in the Narrower Sense? | 58 | ||
| 5. Overview Sources of Disagreement | 59 | ||
| 6. Analysis Disagreements | 60 | ||
| a) The Objectives of the Norm | 60 | ||
| b) Can these Objectives Justify a Criminal Norm? | 63 | ||
| c) Is the Norm an Adequate Means? | 67 | ||
| aa) Protection of the Family | 67 | ||
| bb) Right to Sexual Self-Determination | 68 | ||
| cc) Protection of Public Health | 69 | ||
| d) A Less Restrictive but as Effective Means | 70 | ||
| e) Proportionality in the Narrower Sense | 71 | ||
| 7. The Incest Debate: Deep Disagreements | 72 | ||
| IV. Disagreeing Justices | 74 | ||
| 1. Peer Disagreement and Disagreeing Justices | 74 | ||
| a) Justices as Epistemic Peers | 74 | ||
| aa) They Must Know the Evidence | 75 | ||
| bb) Experts in the Law | 76 | ||
| cc) Overall Conditions are the Same, or Similar Enough | 76 | ||
| dd) Conclusion | 78 | ||
| b) Peer Disagreement as Higher Order Evidence | 78 | ||
| c) Specifics of Legal Disagreement | 79 | ||
| d) Peer Disagreement in Law | 81 | ||
| aa) Disagreement Is Nothing New in Supreme Courts | 82 | ||
| bb) Disagreement Is No Permissible Evidence | 82 | ||
| cc) Reasons v. Votes | 83 | ||
| dd) Individual Judgment Plays a Greater Role | 84 | ||
| ee) Disagreement Is No Indication of a Performance Error | 84 | ||
| e) Summary | 85 | ||
| 2. Ideology and Disagreeing Justices | 86 | ||
| a) Ideological Explanations | 87 | ||
| b) Can Ideology Alone Explain Disagreements Among Justices? | 88 | ||
| aa) Hobby Lobby at the Supreme Court | 89 | ||
| bb) Incest at the Bundesverfassungsgericht | 91 | ||
| cc) General Argument | 92 | ||
| c) Summary | 94 | ||
| 3. Conclusion | 95 | ||
| V. Dealing with Disagreement | 97 | ||
| 1. Legal Practice | 97 | ||
| a) Institutional Role Model | 97 | ||
| b) How Should Disagreement Affect Justices? | 98 | ||
| aa) Reexamine | 98 | ||
| bb) Seeking New Evidence | 100 | ||
| cc) Identifying Common Ground | 100 | ||
| dd) Finding Clarity | 101 | ||
| c) Specific Constellations | 102 | ||
| d) Summary | 102 | ||
| 2. Legal Policy | 103 | ||
| a) Status Quo | 103 | ||
| aa) Supreme Court | 103 | ||
| bb) Bundesverfassungsgericht | 104 | ||
| b) Room for Improvement | 105 | ||
| c) Reaching a Legitimate Decision | 108 | ||
| aa) Majority Decision | 108 | ||
| bb) Lottery | 110 | ||
| cc) Consensus | 110 | ||
| d) Summary | 111 | ||
| 3. Legal Disagreement and Philosophy | 111 | ||
| a) What Should Justices Believe and What Should They Do? | 112 | ||
| b) The Majority Vote Is the Best Decision Mechanism Available | 113 | ||
| c) Two Kinds of Suspension | 114 | ||
| References | 116 | ||
| Index | 125 |