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Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure

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Shi, J. (2022). Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3
Shi, Jiahui. Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure. Duncker & Humblot, 2022. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3
Shi, J (2022): Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3

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Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure

Shi, Jiahui

Beiträge zum Internationalen und Europäischen Strafrecht / Studies in International and European Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 51

(2022)

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About The Author

Jiahui Shi received her Bachelor and Master of Law Degrees from the China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China, and passed the Chinese state exam for legal professionals in 2011. In 2021, she obtained a doctoral degree in law (Dr. jur.) from the University of Cologne (Germany) under the supervision of Professor Dr. Thomas Weigend. Since 2022 she is a research assistant at the Law Faculty, Sichuan University, China. Her research areas cover criminal law, criminal procedure law, comparative law, and the law on privacy.

Abstract

Due to the rise of organized crime and the rapid development of surveillance technologies, such technologies are increasingly used for the purpose of criminal investigation. However, the proliferation of such highly intrusive measures can jeopardize the individual right to privacy and the constitutionally protected secrecy of private telecommunication. It is therefore necessary to devise a legal framework that balances the need for efficient law enforcement with individuals’ privacy rights. In this study, the author discusses the laws on covert surveillance as an investigative measure in the criminal process of the United States, Germany, and the P.R. China from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The author then provides a horizontal comparison of the three legal systems, with the aim of identifying solutions that achieve a proper balance between the protection of the right to privacy and the effective combat of crime.Due to the rise of organized crime and the rapid development of surveillance technologies, such technologies are increasingly used for the purpose of criminal investigation. However, the proliferation of such highly intrusive measures can jeopardize the individual right to privacy and the constitutionally protected secrecy of private telecommunication. It is therefore necessary to devise a legal framework that balances the need for efficient law enforcement with individuals’ privacy rights. In this study, the author discusses the laws on covert surveillance as an investigative measure in the criminal process of the United States, Germany, and the P.R. China from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The author then provides a horizontal comparison of the three legal systems, with the aim of identifying solutions that achieve a proper balance between the protection of the right to privacy and the effective combat of crime.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Foreword 7
Content Overview 9
Contents 11
Introduction 21
I. The Background of the Study 21
II. The Three Jurisdictions 22
III. Presentation of Problems 23
IV. Structure of the Study 24
Part I: Surveillance of Wire and Oral Communications in the U.S. 25
I. Constitutional Protection 26
1. Trespass Doctrine 26
2. From Trespass Doctrine to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 31
3. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” after Katz 32
4. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 35
a) An “Actual (Subjective) Expectation of Privacy” 35
b) An Expectation “that Society is Prepared to Recognize as ˋReasonable'” 37
aa) Social Conceptions of the Expectation of Privacy 38
bb) An Empirical Study of General Attitudes toward Privacy 40
5. The Minimal Expectation of Privacy 42
6. Other Constitutional Aspects of Electronic Surveillance 43
a) 5th Amendment: Privilege against Self-incrimination 43
b) The Attorney-Client Privilege 44
c) 6th Amendment: The Right to Counsel 45
d) Summary 46
II. Surveillance of Wire and Oral Communications in Federal Statutes 47
1. Early Regulation 47
2. The Modern Statute 49
a) The Definition of “Wire Communication” under § 2510‍(1) of Title III 50
b) The Definition of “Oral Communication” under § 2510‍(2) of Title III 52
c) The Definition of “Intercept” under § 2510‍(4) of Title III 53
III. Exceptions from the General Prohibition of Warrantless Surveillance 54
1. Plain Hearing 54
2. Consent to Surveillance under Title III 55
IV. Procedure 59
1. Application Process for a Surveillance Warrant at the Federal Level 59
a) Who can Make and Authorize an Application 59
b) Exigent Circumstances 60
c) Crimes that Can be Investigated by Intercepting Communications 62
d) The Contents of an Application 63
e) Review Criteria 65
aa) Legality and Necessity 65
bb) Effectiveness of the Technology 65
cc) Cost 66
2. The Warrant 66
a) Jurisdiction 66
b) Findings and Determinations 67
aa) Probable Cause 68
bb) Specific Communications to be Intercepted 69
cc) Inadequacy of Investigatory Alternatives 69
(1) Failure or the Unlikely Success of Other Measures 70
(2) Dangers Arising from Other Measures 70
(3) The Frustration of the “Last Resort” Requirement 71
dd) Where Communications Can be Intercepted 71
ee) High Approval Rate of Applications 72
c) The Contents of the Warrant (18 U.S. Code § 2518‍(4)-(6)) 72
aa) The Duration Directive 72
bb) The Termination Directive 73
cc) The Minimization Directive 73
dd) The Progress Report System 76
3. The Role of Police and Prosecutors 77
4. Extension of the Warrant 77
5. Sealing the Evidence 78
6. Giving Notice of Electronic Surveillance 79
V. Exclusionary Rule 80
1. Origin and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule 80
2. Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence under the 4th Amendment 83
3. Admissibility under Section 605 83
4. Admissibility under Title III 84
a) The Scope of the Exclusionary Rule under Title III 85
b) Standing to Demand Suppression 86
aa) Being Party to Communications 86
bb) Possessory Interest 86
cc) The Person against Whom the Interception Was Directed 87
c) Grounds for Excluding Evidence 88
aa) “Unlawfully Intercepted” Communications 88
(1) “Central Role” Test 89
(2) Non-Central Provisions 91
bb) “Insufficient on its Face” (§ 2518‍(10)(a)(ii)) 92
cc) Not “in Conformity with the Order” (§ 2518‍(10)(a)(iii)) 92
dd) Violation of Regulations regarding the Post-Implementation Phase 93
ee) Evidence Derived from Illegal Private Interceptions 94
5. Comments on the Exclusionary Rule 96
VI. Empirical Studies 97
1. Number of Surveillance Applications and Issued Warrants 97
2. Rate of Installed Intercepts 99
3. Types of Surveillance Used 102
4. Major Offenses Named in Warrants 103
5. Duration and Extension 104
6. Cost 106
7. Efficiency of Surveillance 107
a) Rates of Incriminating Information 108
b) Number of Arrests and Convictions 109
VII. Conclusions 110
Part II: Technological Surveillance in the Federal Republic of Germany 114
I. Telecommunication 114
1. Constitutional Protection – Art. 10 German Basic Law 114
a) History 115
b) The Personality Right (“Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht”) 117
aa) The Right to a Private Sphere and the “Core Area of Privacy” 117
bb) The Right to the Spoken Word (“Recht am gesprochenen Wort”) 122
cc) The Relationship between Art. 10, Art. 2 GG and Art. 1 GG 122
c) New Basic Rights 123
aa) The Right to Data Autonomy 123
bb) The Right to the Integrity of Information Systems 124
d) Proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeit) 125
aa) Suitability 125
bb) Necessity 126
cc) Proportionality in the Narrow Sense 127
e) Summary 129
2. Surveillance of Telecommunication under § 100a StPO 129
a) Protected Area of “Telekommunikation” 130
b) Crime Catalogue under § 100a StPO 131
c) Persons Targeted and Third Persons 132
aa) Persons Targeted 133
bb) Third Persons 133
cc) Lawyer-client Communications 134
d) Chance Finds (“Zufallsfunde”) 135
aa) Background Conversations 135
bb) Admissibility of Chance Finds 137
e) Degree of Suspicion under § 100a I 1 Nr. 1. 139
f) Subsidiarity Principle 140
g) “Core Area of Privacy” 142
3. Telecommunication Traffic Data (§ 100g StPO) 145
a) Collection of Telecommunication Traffic Data under § 96 TKG 145
aa) Definition 145
bb) Offenses Covered by § 100g I StPO 146
b) Collection of Data Stored under § 113b TKG 146
c) Traffic Data in a Cellular Network (Funkzellenabfrage) 147
d) The Subsidiarity Clause in § 100g 147
e) Protection of Professionals (§ 100g IV StPO) 148
II. Acoustic Surveillance (akustische Überwachung) 148
1. Acoustic Surveillance of Home 149
a) Art. 13 GG: Inviolability of the Home 149
aa) Historical Background 149
bb) The Definition of “Home” 150
cc) Restrictions of Inviolability under Art. 13 III GG 152
b) § 100c StPO 152
aa) Definition of “Not Publicly” (“nichtöffentlich”) 153
bb) Crime Catalogue of § 100c StPO 153
cc) Concerned Persons and Concerned Homes 154
dd) Facts to Support Suspicion 155
ee) Subsidiarity Principle 155
ff) The Core Area of Privacy 156
gg) Protection of Close Relationships 157
hh) Protection of Professionals 157
2. Acoustic Surveillance in Public Areas (§ 100f StPO) 158
a) The Borderline Cases between § 100c and § 100f StPO 158
b) Conditions for Acoustic Surveillance outside Homes (§ 100f I StPO) 160
c) Persons Affected by the Measure 160
III. Procedure 162
1. Jurisdiction of the Issuing Court and of the Prosecution 162
a) Jurisdiction of the Issuing Court 162
aa) Telecommunication Surveillance under § 100a StPO 162
bb) Acoustic Surveillance of a Home 162
b) Jurisdiction of the Prosecutor “bei Gefahr im Verzug” 163
c) Judicial Control 165
2. Criteria for Judicial Review of an Application 166
3. The Contents of a Surveillance Order 167
4. Duration and Extension of Surveillance 168
5. Implementation of Surveillance 168
6. Termination of the Order 169
7. Notice to Persons under Surveillance 170
8. Legal Remedies against Surveillance 172
9. Deletion and Storage of the Obtained Information 172
IV. “Prohibitions of Evidence” (“Beweisverbote”) 173
1. The Scope of “Prohibitions of Evidence” and its Subgroups 174
2. Theories of “Prohibitions of Using Evidence” 174
a) Rechtskreistheorie 175
b) “Protective Purpose” Doctrine (“Schutzzwecklehre”) 176
c) Balancing Theory 178
d) Summary 180
3. Grounds for Excluding Evidence 182
a) Grounds Directly Based on Constitutional Law 182
aa) Evidence Falling within the “Core Area of Privacy” 182
bb) The Nemo Tenetur Principle and § 136a StPO 183
b) Violating Procedural Rules as Grounds for Excluding Evidence 185
aa) Richtervorbehalt 186
(1) Without Judicial Order because of “Gefahr im Verzug” 186
(2) Without Judicial Order in Other Situations 187
bb) Offense not Listed 187
cc) Insufficient Facts to Support Suspicion 187
dd) Duration 188
c) Evidence from Private Investigation 188
4. Exclusion of Derivative Evidence? (“Fernwirkung”) 191
V. Empirical Reports 194
1. Numbers of Judicial Orders under § 100a and § 100c StPO 194
2. Reasons for Non-Implementation of Judicial Orders under § 100c StPO 196
3. Types of Intercepted Telecommunications 196
4. Catalogue Crimes Cited (“Anlassstraftaten”) 198
a) Number of Procedures of Telecommunication Surveillance 198
b) Number of Procedures of Home Surveillance 201
5. Duration and Extension 202
a) Extension of Judicial Orders under § 100a StPO 202
b) Duration and Extension of Home Surveillance under § 100c StPO 203
c) Cost 204
6. Efficiency 205
VI. Conclusions 206
Part III: Technological Investigative Measures in the People's Republic of China 209
I. Telecommunication and Art. 40 of the Chinese Constitution 209
1. The Concept of Human Dignity in China 209
a) History 209
b) Human Rights and Human Dignity 211
c) Privacy in the Constitution 214
2. Freedom and Privacy of Correspondence 215
a) Definition of “Correspondence” 215
b) Privacy of Correspondence and the Power of the Courts to Order Evidence 216
c) Interception of Letters of Prisoners 218
II. The Inviolability of the Residence and Art. 39 of the Chinese Constitution 218
1. Definition of Residence 219
2. The Limited Understanding of “Illegal Search” and “Illegal Intrusion” 223
III. Technological Measures in Legislation and Departmental Regulations 226
1. The Purpose of Criminal Procedure 226
2. Power Distribution in Criminal Investigations 227
a) The Dominant Role of the Police during the Investigation 227
b) Early Participation of Prosecutors in the Investigation 228
c) The “Inspection” Power of Supervision Committees 232
aa) Supervision Committees 232
bb) The “Inspection” Power 233
cc) Technological Measures during Inspection 234
d) Investigations by Prosecutors as a Supplement to Supervision Committees 235
3. The Covert Nature of TIMs 237
4. Concept and Types of TIMs 239
5. Crime Catalogues of TIMs 241
a) Crime Catalogues under Art. 150 of the CCPL 241
b) Art. 263 of the Procedures for Criminal Cases 2020 242
c) The Use of TIMs for the Purpose of Arresting Suspects 243
d) Crime Catalogue under the Supervision Law and the Rules on the Jurisdiction of the Supervision Committee (Trial) 244
6. Degree of Suspicion 245
7. “For the Needs of the Investigation” and “as Needed” 245
8. Targeted Persons 246
9. Privacy Clause 248
IV. Procedural Requirements 249
1. The Approval Procedure of Police, the Supervision Committees and the Prosecution Offices 249
a) Police 250
b) Prosecution Offices 251
c) Supervision Committees 252
2. Contents of the Warrant 254
3. Implementation 255
4. Duration and Extension of TIMs 256
5. Termination of the Measure 257
6. Obligation to Delete Information 257
V. Admissibility of Information from TIMs 258
1. Art. 154 of the CCPL 2018: New Legislation Concerning Evidence Gathered via TIMs 259
2. The Interpretation of “Other Serious Consequences” 260
3. Three Forms of Evidence 260
4. Examination of the Reliability of TIM Evidence in Camera: A Challenge to the Defense Right 261
5. Defense Strategy 264
6. A Practical Example: Evidence from TIMs in Drug Cases 265
7. The General Rule on Exclusion 266
8. Exclusion of Evidence during Investigation, Prosecution or Inspection 268
a) Police 268
b) Prosecutors 268
c) Supervision Committees 269
9. Exclusion of Evidence by Judges 270
a) Exclusion of Evidence at the Pre-trial Hearing 271
b) Exclusion of Evidence at Trial 274
10. Reasons for the Infrequency of the Exclusion of Evidence 275
a) Exclusion of Evidence and the Emphasis on Truth-finding 275
b) The Heavy Burden of Proof on the Defense and the Lack of Impact of an Exclusion on Convictions 276
c) The Possibility of Correcting Defective Evidence 277
11. Review and Exclusion of Evidence of TIMs 278
12. The “Legitimization” of Evidence: the Move from “Illegal” to “Legal” 281
a) Admissibility of Repeated Confessions 281
b) Indirect Admissibility: the “Delicious” Fruits of the Poisonous Tree 281
c) Incidentally Discovered Evidence 282
13. Admissibility of Evidence Collected by Private Persons in Criminal Proceedings 283
a) Legality of the Collection of Evidence by Private Persons 283
b) Legitimization of Private Evidence 285
VI. Conclusions 285
Part IV: Conclusions with Horizontal Comparison 288
I. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” vs. “Core Area of Privacy” 288
1. Different Constitutional Approaches to the Right to Privacy 288
2. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and “Core Area of Privacy” 291
a) The Subjective Element of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 291
b) The Objective Element of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 292
c) The Minimum Expectation of Privacy 293
3. Constitutionally Protected Spaces in the Three Jurisdictions 293
4. Values behind Different Constitutional Approaches 295
5. Different Methods of Legal Interpretation 296
6. Reasonableness, Balancing od Interests, and Proportionality 298
II. Statutory Protections 299
1. Different Statutory Approaches to Regulating Surveillance 300
2. The Relationship to Other Constitutional Rights 301
a) Self-incrimination 301
b) Attorney-client Privilege 302
III. Procedure 303
1. The Preeminence of the Police in Cases involving Surveillance 303
2. Warrants and Judicial Control 304
3. The Legislative Requirements for a Warrant 305
4. Other Issues Influencing the Issuing of Warrants 305
5. The Last Resort vs. Subsidiarity Principle 306
6. Mechanisms to Enhance Transparency 307
IV. The Exclusionary Rule 308
1. The Role of the Courts 309
2. The Function and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule 310
a) Deterring Police Misconduct 310
b) Truth-finding 312
c) Human Rights 313
3. Theories relating to the Exclusionary Rule 314
a) Balancing Theory 314
b) “Protective Purpose” Theory 314
c) Inevitable Discovery Rule 315
4. Grounds for Excluding Surveillance Evidence 317
5. Exceptions 318
a) Plain Hearing 318
b) Consent Surveillance 319
c) Emergency Situations 319
d) Good Faith 320
6. The “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” vs. the Distance Effect of Exclusion 321
7. When to Exclude Evidence 322
a) United States 322
b) Germany 323
c) China 323
8. Evidence Obtained by Private Parties 324
V. Empirical Studies 325
1. Number of Surveillance Warrants 325
2. Types of Surveillance Measures 326
3. Major Offenses in Surveillance Orders 327
4. Cost 327
5. Efficiency 327
VI. Final Comments and Suggestions for Reforms in China 328
1. Constitutional Level 329
2. Legislation Level 330
a) Greater Clarification of TIMs in Legislation and in Practice 330
b) Greater Detail in Application Materials and Warrants 331
c) Warrants to be Approved by Prosecutors 332
d) Limiting the Use of Chance Findings and Tracking Technology 333
e) Reporting System and Statistics 333
f) Reform of the Application of the Exclusionary Rule 334
3. Prospects for Better Criminal Justice 335
Appendix 336
Reports on the questionnaires 336
Report on Model A (for Police) 337
Report on Model B (for Prosecutors and Judges) 347
References 357
Index 374