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Shi, J. (2022). Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure. Duncker & Humblot. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3
Shi, Jiahui. Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure. Duncker & Humblot, 2022. Book. https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3
Shi, J (2022): Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure, Duncker & Humblot, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-58566-3
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Technological Surveillance of Communication in American, German and Chinese Criminal Procedure
(2022)
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Jiahui Shi received her Bachelor and Master of Law Degrees from the China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China, and passed the Chinese state exam for legal professionals in 2011. In 2021, she obtained a doctoral degree in law (Dr. jur.) from the University of Cologne (Germany) under the supervision of Professor Dr. Thomas Weigend. Since 2022 she is a research assistant at the Law Faculty, Sichuan University, China. Her research areas cover criminal law, criminal procedure law, comparative law, and the law on privacy.Abstract
Due to the rise of organized crime and the rapid development of surveillance technologies, such technologies are increasingly used for the purpose of criminal investigation. However, the proliferation of such highly intrusive measures can jeopardize the individual right to privacy and the constitutionally protected secrecy of private telecommunication. It is therefore necessary to devise a legal framework that balances the need for efficient law enforcement with individuals’ privacy rights. In this study, the author discusses the laws on covert surveillance as an investigative measure in the criminal process of the United States, Germany, and the P.R. China from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The author then provides a horizontal comparison of the three legal systems, with the aim of identifying solutions that achieve a proper balance between the protection of the right to privacy and the effective combat of crime.Due to the rise of organized crime and the rapid development of surveillance technologies, such technologies are increasingly used for the purpose of criminal investigation. However, the proliferation of such highly intrusive measures can jeopardize the individual right to privacy and the constitutionally protected secrecy of private telecommunication. It is therefore necessary to devise a legal framework that balances the need for efficient law enforcement with individuals’ privacy rights. In this study, the author discusses the laws on covert surveillance as an investigative measure in the criminal process of the United States, Germany, and the P.R. China from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The author then provides a horizontal comparison of the three legal systems, with the aim of identifying solutions that achieve a proper balance between the protection of the right to privacy and the effective combat of crime.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foreword | 7 | ||
| Content Overview | 9 | ||
| Contents | 11 | ||
| Introductio | 21 | ||
| I. The Background of the Study | 21 | ||
| II. The Three Jurisdictions | 22 | ||
| III. Presentation of Problems | 23 | ||
| IV. Structure of the Study | 24 | ||
| Part I: Surveillance of Wire and Oral Communications in the U.S. | 25 | ||
| I. Constitutional Protectio | 26 | ||
| 1. Trespass Doctrine | 26 | ||
| 2. From Trespass Doctrine to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy | 31 | ||
| 3. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” after Katz | 32 | ||
| 4. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy | 35 | ||
| a) An “Actual (Subjective) Expectation of Privacy” | 35 | ||
| b) An Expectation “that Society is Prepared to Recognize as ˋReasonable'” | 37 | ||
| aa) Social Conceptions of the Expectation of Privacy | 38 | ||
| bb) An Empirical Study of General Attitudes toward Privacy | 40 | ||
| 5. The Minimal Expectation of Privacy | 42 | ||
| 6. Other Constitutional Aspects of Electronic Surveillance | 43 | ||
| a) 5th Amendment: Privilege against Self-incriminatio | 43 | ||
| b) The Attorney-Client Privilege | 44 | ||
| c) 6th Amendment: The Right to Counsel | 45 | ||
| d) Summary | 46 | ||
| II. Surveillance of Wire and Oral Communications in Federal Statutes | 47 | ||
| 1. Early Regulatio | 47 | ||
| 2. The Modern Statute | 49 | ||
| a) The Definition of “Wire Communication” under § 2510(1) of Title III | 50 | ||
| b) The Definition of “Oral Communication” under § 2510(2) of Title III | 52 | ||
| c) The Definition of “Intercept” under § 2510(4) of Title III | 53 | ||
| III. Exceptions from the General Prohibition of Warrantless Surveillance | 54 | ||
| 1. Plain Hearing | 54 | ||
| 2. Consent to Surveillance under Title III | 55 | ||
| IV. Procedure | 59 | ||
| 1. Application Process for a Surveillance Warrant at the Federal Level | 59 | ||
| a) Who can Make and Authorize an Applicatio | 59 | ||
| b) Exigent Circumstances | 60 | ||
| c) Crimes that Can be Investigated by Intercepting Communications | 62 | ||
| d) The Contents of an Applicatio | 63 | ||
| e) Review Criteria | 65 | ||
| aa) Legality and Necessity | 65 | ||
| bb) Effectiveness of the Technology | 65 | ||
| cc) Cost | 66 | ||
| 2. The Warrant | 66 | ||
| a) Jurisdictio | 66 | ||
| b) Findings and Determinations | 67 | ||
| aa) Probable Cause | 68 | ||
| bb) Specific Communications to be Intercepted | 69 | ||
| cc) Inadequacy of Investigatory Alternatives | 69 | ||
| (1) Failure or the Unlikely Success of Other Measures | 70 | ||
| (2) Dangers Arising from Other Measures | 70 | ||
| (3) The Frustration of the “Last Resort” Requirement | 71 | ||
| dd) Where Communications Can be Intercepted | 71 | ||
| ee) High Approval Rate of Applications | 72 | ||
| c) The Contents of the Warrant (18 U.S. Code § 2518(4)-(6)) | 72 | ||
| aa) The Duration Directive | 72 | ||
| bb) The Termination Directive | 73 | ||
| cc) The Minimization Directive | 73 | ||
| dd) The Progress Report System | 76 | ||
| 3. The Role of Police and Prosecutors | 77 | ||
| 4. Extension of the Warrant | 77 | ||
| 5. Sealing the Evidence | 78 | ||
| 6. Giving Notice of Electronic Surveillance | 79 | ||
| V. Exclusionary Rule | 80 | ||
| 1. Origin and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule | 80 | ||
| 2. Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence under the 4th Amendment | 83 | ||
| 3. Admissibility under Section 605 | 83 | ||
| 4. Admissibility under Title III | 84 | ||
| a) The Scope of the Exclusionary Rule under Title III | 85 | ||
| b) Standing to Demand Suppressio | 86 | ||
| aa) Being Party to Communications | 86 | ||
| bb) Possessory Interest | 86 | ||
| cc) The Person against Whom the Interception Was Directed | 87 | ||
| c) Grounds for Excluding Evidence | 88 | ||
| aa) “Unlawfully Intercepted” Communications | 88 | ||
| (1) “Central Role” Test | 89 | ||
| (2) Non-Central Provisions | 91 | ||
| bb) “Insufficient on its Face” (§ 2518(10)(a)(ii)) | 92 | ||
| cc) Not “in Conformity with the Order” (§ 2518(10)(a)(iii)) | 92 | ||
| dd) Violation of Regulations regarding the Post-Implementation Phase | 93 | ||
| ee) Evidence Derived from Illegal Private Interceptions | 94 | ||
| 5. Comments on the Exclusionary Rule | 96 | ||
| VI. Empirical Studies | 97 | ||
| 1. Number of Surveillance Applications and Issued Warrants | 97 | ||
| 2. Rate of Installed Intercepts | 99 | ||
| 3. Types of Surveillance Used | 102 | ||
| 4. Major Offenses Named in Warrants | 103 | ||
| 5. Duration and Extensio | 104 | ||
| 6. Cost | 106 | ||
| 7. Efficiency of Surveillance | 107 | ||
| a) Rates of Incriminating Informatio | 108 | ||
| b) Number of Arrests and Convictions | 109 | ||
| VII. Conclusions | 110 | ||
| Part II: Technological Surveillance in the Federal Republic of Germany | 114 | ||
| I. Telecommunicatio | 114 | ||
| 1. Constitutional Protection – Art. 10 German Basic Law | 114 | ||
| a) History | 115 | ||
| b) The Personality Right (“Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht”) | 117 | ||
| aa) The Right to a Private Sphere and the “Core Area of Privacy” | 117 | ||
| bb) The Right to the Spoken Word (“Recht am gesprochenen Wort”) | 122 | ||
| cc) The Relationship between Art. 10, Art. 2 GG and Art. 1 GG | 122 | ||
| c) New Basic Rights | 123 | ||
| aa) The Right to Data Autonomy | 123 | ||
| bb) The Right to the Integrity of Information Systems | 124 | ||
| d) Proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeit) | 125 | ||
| aa) Suitability | 125 | ||
| bb) Necessity | 126 | ||
| cc) Proportionality in the Narrow Sense | 127 | ||
| e) Summary | 129 | ||
| 2. Surveillance of Telecommunication under § 100a StPO | 129 | ||
| a) Protected Area of “Telekommunikation” | 130 | ||
| b) Crime Catalogue under § 100a StPO | 131 | ||
| c) Persons Targeted and Third Persons | 132 | ||
| aa) Persons Targeted | 133 | ||
| bb) Third Persons | 133 | ||
| cc) Lawyer-client Communications | 134 | ||
| d) Chance Finds (“Zufallsfunde”) | 135 | ||
| aa) Background Conversations | 135 | ||
| bb) Admissibility of Chance Finds | 137 | ||
| e) Degree of Suspicion under § 100a I 1 Nr. 1. | 139 | ||
| f) Subsidiarity Principle | 140 | ||
| g) “Core Area of Privacy” | 142 | ||
| 3. Telecommunication Traffic Data (§ 100g StPO) | 145 | ||
| a) Collection of Telecommunication Traffic Data under § 96 TKG | 145 | ||
| aa) Definitio | 145 | ||
| bb) Offenses Covered by § 100g I StPO | 146 | ||
| b) Collection of Data Stored under § 113b TKG | 146 | ||
| c) Traffic Data in a Cellular Network (Funkzellenabfrage) | 147 | ||
| d) The Subsidiarity Clause in § 100g | 147 | ||
| e) Protection of Professionals (§ 100g IV StPO) | 148 | ||
| II. Acoustic Surveillance (akustische Überwachung) | 148 | ||
| 1. Acoustic Surveillance of Home | 149 | ||
| a) Art. 13 GG: Inviolability of the Home | 149 | ||
| aa) Historical Background | 149 | ||
| bb) The Definition of “Home” | 150 | ||
| cc) Restrictions of Inviolability under Art. 13 III GG | 152 | ||
| b) § 100c StPO | 152 | ||
| aa) Definition of “Not Publicly” (“nichtöffentlich”) | 153 | ||
| bb) Crime Catalogue of § 100c StPO | 153 | ||
| cc) Concerned Persons and Concerned Homes | 154 | ||
| dd) Facts to Support Suspicio | 155 | ||
| ee) Subsidiarity Principle | 155 | ||
| ff) The Core Area of Privacy | 156 | ||
| gg) Protection of Close Relationships | 157 | ||
| hh) Protection of Professionals | 157 | ||
| 2. Acoustic Surveillance in Public Areas (§ 100f StPO) | 158 | ||
| a) The Borderline Cases between § 100c and § 100f StPO | 158 | ||
| b) Conditions for Acoustic Surveillance outside Homes (§ 100f I StPO) | 160 | ||
| c) Persons Affected by the Measure | 160 | ||
| III. Procedure | 162 | ||
| 1. Jurisdiction of the Issuing Court and of the Prosecutio | 162 | ||
| a) Jurisdiction of the Issuing Court | 162 | ||
| aa) Telecommunication Surveillance under § 100a StPO | 162 | ||
| bb) Acoustic Surveillance of a Home | 162 | ||
| b) Jurisdiction of the Prosecutor “bei Gefahr im Verzug” | 163 | ||
| c) Judicial Control | 165 | ||
| 2. Criteria for Judicial Review of an Applicatio | 166 | ||
| 3. The Contents of a Surveillance Orde | 167 | ||
| 4. Duration and Extension of Surveillance | 168 | ||
| 5. Implementation of Surveillance | 168 | ||
| 6. Termination of the Orde | 169 | ||
| 7. Notice to Persons under Surveillance | 170 | ||
| 8. Legal Remedies against Surveillance | 172 | ||
| 9. Deletion and Storage of the Obtained Informatio | 172 | ||
| IV. “Prohibitions of Evidence” (“Beweisverbote”) | 173 | ||
| 1. The Scope of “Prohibitions of Evidence” and its Subgroups | 174 | ||
| 2. Theories of “Prohibitions of Using Evidence” | 174 | ||
| a) Rechtskreistheorie | 175 | ||
| b) “Protective Purpose” Doctrine (“Schutzzwecklehre”) | 176 | ||
| c) Balancing Theory | 178 | ||
| d) Summary | 180 | ||
| 3. Grounds for Excluding Evidence | 182 | ||
| a) Grounds Directly Based on Constitutional Law | 182 | ||
| aa) Evidence Falling within the “Core Area of Privacy” | 182 | ||
| bb) The Nemo Tenetur Principle and § 136a StPO | 183 | ||
| b) Violating Procedural Rules as Grounds for Excluding Evidence | 185 | ||
| aa) Richtervorbehalt | 186 | ||
| (1) Without Judicial Order because of “Gefahr im Verzug” | 186 | ||
| (2) Without Judicial Order in Other Situations | 187 | ||
| bb) Offense not Listed | 187 | ||
| cc) Insufficient Facts to Support Suspicio | 187 | ||
| dd) Duratio | 188 | ||
| c) Evidence from Private Investigatio | 188 | ||
| 4. Exclusion of Derivative Evidence? (“Fernwirkung”) | 191 | ||
| V. Empirical Reports | 194 | ||
| 1. Numbers of Judicial Orders under § 100a and § 100c StPO | 194 | ||
| 2. Reasons for Non-Implementation of Judicial Orders under § 100c StPO | 196 | ||
| 3. Types of Intercepted Telecommunications | 196 | ||
| 4. Catalogue Crimes Cited (“Anlassstraftaten”) | 198 | ||
| a) Number of Procedures of Telecommunication Surveillance | 198 | ||
| b) Number of Procedures of Home Surveillance | 201 | ||
| 5. Duration and Extensio | 202 | ||
| a) Extension of Judicial Orders under § 100a StPO | 202 | ||
| b) Duration and Extension of Home Surveillance under § 100c StPO | 203 | ||
| c) Cost | 204 | ||
| 6. Efficiency | 205 | ||
| VI. Conclusions | 206 | ||
| Part III: Technological Investigative Measures in the People's Republic of China | 209 | ||
| I. Telecommunication and Art. 40 of the Chinese Constitutio | 209 | ||
| 1. The Concept of Human Dignity in China | 209 | ||
| a) History | 209 | ||
| b) Human Rights and Human Dignity | 211 | ||
| c) Privacy in the Constitutio | 214 | ||
| 2. Freedom and Privacy of Correspondence | 215 | ||
| a) Definition of “Correspondence” | 215 | ||
| b) Privacy of Correspondence and the Power of the Courts to Order Evidence | 216 | ||
| c) Interception of Letters of Prisoners | 218 | ||
| II. The Inviolability of the Residence and Art. 39 of the Chinese Constitutio | 218 | ||
| 1. Definition of Residence | 219 | ||
| 2. The Limited Understanding of “Illegal Search” and “Illegal Intrusion” | 223 | ||
| III. Technological Measures in Legislation and Departmental Regulations | 226 | ||
| 1. The Purpose of Criminal Procedure | 226 | ||
| 2. Power Distribution in Criminal Investigations | 227 | ||
| a) The Dominant Role of the Police during the Investigatio | 227 | ||
| b) Early Participation of Prosecutors in the Investigatio | 228 | ||
| c) The “Inspection” Power of Supervision Committees | 232 | ||
| aa) Supervision Committees | 232 | ||
| bb) The “Inspection” Powe | 233 | ||
| cc) Technological Measures during Inspectio | 234 | ||
| d) Investigations by Prosecutors as a Supplement to Supervision Committees | 235 | ||
| 3. The Covert Nature of TIMs | 237 | ||
| 4. Concept and Types of TIMs | 239 | ||
| 5. Crime Catalogues of TIMs | 241 | ||
| a) Crime Catalogues under Art. 150 of the CCPL | 241 | ||
| b) Art. 263 of the Procedures for Criminal Cases 2020 | 242 | ||
| c) The Use of TIMs for the Purpose of Arresting Suspects | 243 | ||
| d) Crime Catalogue under the Supervision Law and the Rules on the Jurisdiction of the Supervision Committee (Trial) | 244 | ||
| 6. Degree of Suspicio | 245 | ||
| 7. “For the Needs of the Investigation” and “as Needed” | 245 | ||
| 8. Targeted Persons | 246 | ||
| 9. Privacy Clause | 248 | ||
| IV. Procedural Requirements | 249 | ||
| 1. The Approval Procedure of Police, the Supervision Committees and the Prosecution Offices | 249 | ||
| a) Police | 250 | ||
| b) Prosecution Offices | 251 | ||
| c) Supervision Committees | 252 | ||
| 2. Contents of the Warrant | 254 | ||
| 3. Implementatio | 255 | ||
| 4. Duration and Extension of TIMs | 256 | ||
| 5. Termination of the Measure | 257 | ||
| 6. Obligation to Delete Informatio | 257 | ||
| V. Admissibility of Information from TIMs | 258 | ||
| 1. Art. 154 of the CCPL 2018: New Legislation Concerning Evidence Gathered via TIMs | 259 | ||
| 2. The Interpretation of “Other Serious Consequences” | 260 | ||
| 3. Three Forms of Evidence | 260 | ||
| 4. Examination of the Reliability of TIM Evidence in Camera: A Challenge to the Defense Right | 261 | ||
| 5. Defense Strategy | 264 | ||
| 6. A Practical Example: Evidence from TIMs in Drug Cases | 265 | ||
| 7. The General Rule on Exclusio | 266 | ||
| 8. Exclusion of Evidence during Investigation, Prosecution or Inspectio | 268 | ||
| a) Police | 268 | ||
| b) Prosecutors | 268 | ||
| c) Supervision Committees | 269 | ||
| 9. Exclusion of Evidence by Judges | 270 | ||
| a) Exclusion of Evidence at the Pre-trial Hearing | 271 | ||
| b) Exclusion of Evidence at Trial | 274 | ||
| 10. Reasons for the Infrequency of the Exclusion of Evidence | 275 | ||
| a) Exclusion of Evidence and the Emphasis on Truth-finding | 275 | ||
| b) The Heavy Burden of Proof on the Defense and the Lack of Impact of an Exclusion on Convictions | 276 | ||
| c) The Possibility of Correcting Defective Evidence | 277 | ||
| 11. Review and Exclusion of Evidence of TIMs | 278 | ||
| 12. The “Legitimization” of Evidence: the Move from “Illegal” to “Legal” | 281 | ||
| a) Admissibility of Repeated Confessions | 281 | ||
| b) Indirect Admissibility: the “Delicious” Fruits of the Poisonous Tree | 281 | ||
| c) Incidentally Discovered Evidence | 282 | ||
| 13. Admissibility of Evidence Collected by Private Persons in Criminal Proceedings | 283 | ||
| a) Legality of the Collection of Evidence by Private Persons | 283 | ||
| b) Legitimization of Private Evidence | 285 | ||
| VI. Conclusions | 285 | ||
| Part IV: Conclusions with Horizontal Compariso | 288 | ||
| I. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” vs. “Core Area of Privacy” | 288 | ||
| 1. Different Constitutional Approaches to the Right to Privacy | 288 | ||
| 2. “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and “Core Area of Privacy” | 291 | ||
| a) The Subjective Element of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy | 291 | ||
| b) The Objective Element of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy | 292 | ||
| c) The Minimum Expectation of Privacy | 293 | ||
| 3. Constitutionally Protected Spaces in the Three Jurisdictions | 293 | ||
| 4. Values behind Different Constitutional Approaches | 295 | ||
| 5. Different Methods of Legal Interpretatio | 296 | ||
| 6. Reasonableness, Balancing od Interests, and Proportionality | 298 | ||
| II. Statutory Protections | 299 | ||
| 1. Different Statutory Approaches to Regulating Surveillance | 300 | ||
| 2. The Relationship to Other Constitutional Rights | 301 | ||
| a) Self-incriminatio | 301 | ||
| b) Attorney-client Privilege | 302 | ||
| III. Procedure | 303 | ||
| 1. The Preeminence of the Police in Cases involving Surveillance | 303 | ||
| 2. Warrants and Judicial Control | 304 | ||
| 3. The Legislative Requirements for a Warrant | 305 | ||
| 4. Other Issues Influencing the Issuing of Warrants | 305 | ||
| 5. The Last Resort vs. Subsidiarity Principle | 306 | ||
| 6. Mechanisms to Enhance Transparency | 307 | ||
| IV. The Exclusionary Rule | 308 | ||
| 1. The Role of the Courts | 309 | ||
| 2. The Function and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule | 310 | ||
| a) Deterring Police Misconduct | 310 | ||
| b) Truth-finding | 312 | ||
| c) Human Rights | 313 | ||
| 3. Theories relating to the Exclusionary Rule | 314 | ||
| a) Balancing Theory | 314 | ||
| b) “Protective Purpose” Theory | 314 | ||
| c) Inevitable Discovery Rule | 315 | ||
| 4. Grounds for Excluding Surveillance Evidence | 317 | ||
| 5. Exceptions | 318 | ||
| a) Plain Hearing | 318 | ||
| b) Consent Surveillance | 319 | ||
| c) Emergency Situations | 319 | ||
| d) Good Faith | 320 | ||
| 6. The “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” vs. the Distance Effect of Exclusio | 321 | ||
| 7. When to Exclude Evidence | 322 | ||
| a) United States | 322 | ||
| b) Germany | 323 | ||
| c) China | 323 | ||
| 8. Evidence Obtained by Private Parties | 324 | ||
| V. Empirical Studies | 325 | ||
| 1. Number of Surveillance Warrants | 325 | ||
| 2. Types of Surveillance Measures | 326 | ||
| 3. Major Offenses in Surveillance Orders | 327 | ||
| 4. Cost | 327 | ||
| 5. Efficiency | 327 | ||
| VI. Final Comments and Suggestions for Reforms in China | 328 | ||
| 1. Constitutional Level | 329 | ||
| 2. Legislation Level | 330 | ||
| a) Greater Clarification of TIMs in Legislation and in Practice | 330 | ||
| b) Greater Detail in Application Materials and Warrants | 331 | ||
| c) Warrants to be Approved by Prosecutors | 332 | ||
| d) Limiting the Use of Chance Findings and Tracking Technology | 333 | ||
| e) Reporting System and Statistics | 333 | ||
| f) Reform of the Application of the Exclusionary Rule | 334 | ||
| 3. Prospects for Better Criminal Justice | 335 | ||
| Appendix | 336 | ||
| Reports on the questionnaires | 336 | ||
| Report on Model A (for Police) | 337 | ||
| Report on Model B (for Prosecutors and Judges) | 347 | ||
| References | 357 | ||
| Index | 374 |