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Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State

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  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch
  4. Vol. 139, Issue 2–4
  5. pp. 365–384

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Schnellenbach, J. Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 139(2–4), 365-384. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365
Schnellenbach, Jan "Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 139.2–4, 2019, 365-384. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365
Schnellenbach, Jan (2019): Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 139, iss. 2–4, 365-384, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365
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Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State

Schnellenbach, Jan

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 139 (2019), Iss. 2–4 : pp. 365–384

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.139.2-4.365
Language
English
Pages
20
Keywords

Author Details

Schnellenbach, Jan, Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences, Brandenburg University of Technology, 03046 Cottbus, Germany.

Cited By

  1. Hayekian economic policy

    Feld, Lars P.

    Nientiedt, Daniel

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 204 (2022), Iss. P.457

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.019 [Citations: 0]

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Abstract

A classical liberal market order relies on competition which, in a neoliberal perspective, should be supported by a government regulating the admissible degree of market power. Market competition itself is seen as an engine of innovation and growth. The downside of such a classical liberal market order is a lack of economic security for market participants. It is the very core of such an order that it enforces consumer sovereignty, but the demand articulated by consumers vis-à-vis single suppliers can be volatile. In this article, we revisit the classical liberal debate on means of providing economic security. We then discuss the problem in a contractarian framework that allows for conflicts between individual absolute values. We argue that political institutions that facilitate an open debate on these conflicting values are essential, and that attempts to derive optimal sizes of welfare states in a technocratic fashion are futile.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Jan Schnellenbach: Revisiting the Tension Between Classical Liberalism and the Welfare State 1
Abstract 1
1. Introduction 1
2. The Colloque Walter Lippmannon Economic Security 4
3. Classical Liberal Positions on Liberty,Economic Security, and the Problem of Inequality 6
3.1 Defining Economic Security 6
3.2 Economic Security and Inequality 7
3.3 Individual Liberty 9
4. The Welfare State, Liberalism,and the Stability of the Market Economy 1
4.1 Why Classical Liberals Can Accepta Limited Welfare State 1
4.2 Why Non-Liberals Should AcceptLimits to the Welfare State 1
4.3 Learning How to Redistribute 1
5. Conclusions 1
References 1

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