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Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa

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Cantens, T. Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa. Sociologus, 63(1–2), 37-58. https://doi.org/10.3790/soc.63.1-2.37
Cantens, Thomas "Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa" Sociologus 63.1–2, 2013, 37-58. https://doi.org/10.3790/soc.63.1-2.37
Cantens, Thomas (2013): Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa, in: Sociologus, vol. 63, iss. 1–2, 37-58, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/soc.63.1-2.37

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Other People's Money and Goods: The Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa

Cantens, Thomas

Sociologus, Vol. 63 (2013), Iss. 1–2 : pp. 37–58

3 Citations (CrossRef)

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Thomas Cantens, Organisation Mondiale des Douanes, Unité Recherche et Stratégies, 30 Rue du Marché, B-1210 Bruxelles.

Cited By

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  3. Controlling petty corruption in public administrations of developing countries through digitalization: An opportunity theory informed study of Ghana customs

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Abstract

The article aims to examine the exercise of coercion by Customs in some Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA). In SSA, Customs collect 30% to 65% of state revenues. This predominance of the revenue function makes Customs an elite within the state apparatus mainly dedicated to ’development". The analysis is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted over 4 years.

Because Customs services embody part of the state, their practices contribute to build and unveil the social relation to tax of the national economic elites whose wealth is mainly based on international trade. In the field, balancing the lack of material resources, need for profitability, revenue targets set by the political authority and corrupt practices of some, Customs officials negotiate coercion with users. This relationship based on negotiation is supported by rituals such as measurement, use of computers and public dialogue that engage both officials and users into a technical vision of taxation.