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Interaktion bei der qualitativen Bankenaufsicht – Wahrnehmungen der Banken und der Aufseher
Paul, Stephan | Prystav, Fabian | Stein, Stefan
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 48 (2015), Iss. 1 : pp. 51–87
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Prof. Dr. Stephan Paul, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Lehrstuhl für Finanzierung und Kreditwirtschaft, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780 Bochum
Fabian Prystav, M.A., Ruhr-Universität Bochum, ikf? institut für kredit- und finanzwirtschaft, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780 Bochum
Prof. Dr. Stefan Stein, Rektor, BiTS Business and Information Technology School, Reiterweg 26b, 58636 Iserlohn
Abstract
Qualitative supervision requires the supervisors" access to a bank"s internal information. In the sovereign business relationship between a bank and the supervisory authorities this access can be enforced. However, the efficiency in overcoming information asymmetries – and therefore the contribution to the goal of greater system stability – heavily depends on the interaction quality in the business relationship. This study aims at analyzing the interaction quality between banks and supervisors and deriving areas for improvement. We apply the critical incident technique to analyze qualitative interviews with executives of German cooperative and savings banks and mirror their perceptions with the results of two workshops conducted with representatives of the German banking supervisory institutions Bundesbank and BaFin. It is shown that efficient supervisory communication requires time, thorough preparation and a proactive attitude. Clear mutual expectations are the basis for trustful interactions.