Abstract

Here is a brief summary of the main points of the paper: 1. The supposed tension between public reason and rhetorical persuasion. Rhetorical theorists often regard public reason as rationalistic and artificial. It is accused of ignoring the expectations of actual audiences and rejecting persuasive strategies that, in addition to being common in political discourse, can be utilized in non-fallacious and non-coercive ways. 2. The rhetorical value of public reason. We have argued against the sharp contrast between public reason and rhetoric. We have tried to show that abiding by – and explicitly invoking – public reason may be an effective persuasive strategy (indeed the most obvious strategy) for persuading as many individuals as possible in contexts of audience diversity. 3. The relation between public reason and logos. The rhetorical value of public reason is often denied because it is seen as being obsessed with logos. But public reason does make room for various persuasive strategies, such as narrative, so long as they do not violate the basic condition of avoiding the affirmation of contentious ideologies and worldviews. 4. A caveat. The rhetorical side of public reason was insufficiently explored by Rawls and other political liberals. The main ambition of this paper was not to propose anewinterpretation of any text by Rawls and other liberals, but to argue that the notion of public reason can be presented in a way that – true to its purpose of checking sectarianism in political discourse – is not fundamentally at odds with contemporary rhetorical theory.