Abstract

It is well-known that Kelsen supported a relativistic conception of justice, just as it is also known that he considered his relativistic view to be confirmed by the many different ways the word ‘justice’ is used and defined. In this article it will be argued that Kelsen’s relativistic conception of justice can be seen as not simply the consequence of perceiving that the word ‘justice’ is used in different ways, but also as the result of his conception of causality, and of his rejection of the possibility for individuals to choose which value judgements they will have. It can also be seen as a consequence of the conception that if people’s value judgments are causally determined, then there is no reason to support an absolutistic conception of justice. Three main steps will be taken in order to justify this reading of Kelsen’s relativism. Initially the way Kelsen understood and dealt with the idea of universal causality and human freedom will be presented. After that the key elements of Kelsen’s conception of values and value judgements will be indicated, as well as their connection with his perspective on universal causality. Finally, Kelsen’s arguments on justice as necessarily relative will be analyzed in order to point out the reasons why his conception of causality reinforced his arguments in favor of a relativistic conception of justice, and also to argue that his conclusion on justice is a possible one, albeit not necessarily true.