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M2M Call Termination – Regulation or Competition?

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Gabrielsen, T., Vagstad, S. M2M Call Termination – Regulation or Competition?. Applied Economics Quarterly, 54(3), 203-215. https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.54.3.203
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl and Vagstad, Steinar "M2M Call Termination – Regulation or Competition?" Applied Economics Quarterly 54.3, , 203-215. https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.54.3.203
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl/Vagstad, Steinar: M2M Call Termination – Regulation or Competition?, in: Applied Economics Quarterly, vol. 54, iss. 3, 203-215, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.54.3.203

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M2M Call Termination – Regulation or Competition?

Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl | Vagstad, Steinar

Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2008), Iss. 3 : pp. 203–215

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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1Norwegian Competition Authority, University of Bergen.

2University of Bergen.

Cited By

  1. Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation

    Dewenter, Ralf

    Kruse, Jörn

    Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 23 (2011), Iss. 1 P.107

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.09.001 [Citations: 15]

Abstract

We review the recent literature on mobile termination rates (MTR) in mobile communication networks (M2M). This literature shows that mobile networks may have incentives to charge ineficient high termination charges leading to reduced surplus for consumers and society, and therefore should be regulated. We discuss optimal regulation of MTRs and the two main objectives behind current regulation: excessive pricing and entry assistance. We also present a sketch of a new regulatory regime for the mobile industry.