Menu Expand

Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data

  1. Journals
  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Applied Economics Quarterly
  4. Vol. 67, Issue 2
  5. pp. 143–175

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style
Kölling, A. Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data. Applied Economics Quarterly, 67(2), 143-175. https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.67.2.143
Kölling, Arnd "Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data" Applied Economics Quarterly 67.2, 2021, 143-175. https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.67.2.143
Kölling, Arnd (2021): Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data, in: Applied Economics Quarterly, vol. 67, iss. 2, 143-175, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.67.2.143
Format
Download

Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data

Kölling, Arnd

Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 67 (2021), Iss. 2 : pp. 143–175

1 Citations (CrossRef)

Preview Login to order (PDF)

Additional Information

Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.67.2.143
Language
English
Pages
33
Keywords

Pricing

Individual
€ 26.00 (incl. local VAT if applicable)

Author Details

Arnd Kölling, Professor of Empirical Economics, Berlin School of Economics and Law/Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin (HWR), Alt-Friedrichsfelde 60, D-10315 Berlin, Orcid: 0000-0003-1129-6604.

Cited By

  1. How elastic is labor demand? A meta-analysis for the German labor market

    Popp, Martin

    Journal for Labour Market Research, Vol. 57 (2023), Iss. 1

    https://doi.org/10.1186/s12651-023-00337-8 [Citations: 0]

References

  1. Addison, J. T./Bellmann, L./Schank, T./Teixeira, P. (2008): “The demand for labour: an analysis using matched employer–employee data from the German LIAB. Will the high unskilled worker own-wage elasticity please stand up?,” Journal of Labour Research 29, 114–137.  Google Scholar
  2. Addison, J. T./Portugal, P./Varejão, J. (2014): “Labor demand research: Toward a better match between better theory and better data,” Labour Economics 30, 4–11.  Google Scholar
  3. Bassanini, A./Breda, T./Carol, E./Rebérioux, A. (2013): “Working in family firms: Paid less but more secure?,” ILR Review 66, 433–466.  Google Scholar
  4. Bauer, T./Kourouxous, T./Krenn, P. (2018): “Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review,” Business Research 11, 33–76.  Google Scholar
  5. Bennedsen, M./Nielsen, K./Pérez-González, F./Wolfenzon, D. (2007): “Inside the family firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 647–691.  Google Scholar
  6. Bjuggren, C. (2015): “Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 119, 18–31.  Google Scholar
  7. Block, J. (2010): “Family management, family ownership, and downsizing: Evidence from S&P 500 firms,” Family Business Review 23, 109–130.  Google Scholar
  8. Block, J./Fisch, C./Lau, J./Obschonka, M./Presse, A. (2016): “Who prefers working in family firms? An exploratory study of individuals’ organizational preferences across 40 countries,” Journal of Family Business Strategy 7, 65–74.  Google Scholar
  9. Block, J./Fisch, C./Lau, J./Obschonka, M./Presse, A. (2019): “How Do Labour Market Institutions Influence the Preference to Work in Family Firms? A Multilevel Analysis Across 40 Countries,” Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 43, 1067–1093.  Google Scholar
  10. Bohachova, O./Boockmann, B./Buch, C. (2011): “Labour demand during the crisis: what happened in Germany,” IZA Discussion Paper 6074, Bonn.  Google Scholar
  11. Brenzel, H./Czepek, J./Kubis, A./Moczall, A./Rebien, M./Röttger, C./Szameitat, J./Warning, A./Weber, E. (2016): “Neueinstellungen im Jahr 2015: Stellen werden häufig über persönliche Kontakte besetzt.” IAB-Kurzbericht 4/2016, Nuremberg.  Google Scholar
  12. Cahuc, P./Carcillo, S./Zylberberg, A. (2014): “Labor economics,” MIT press, Cambridge MA.  Google Scholar
  13. Card, D./Heining, J./Kline, P. (2015): “CHK effects,” FDZ Methodenreport 06/2015, Nuremberg.  Google Scholar
  14. Chrisman, J./Devaraj, S./Patel, P. (2017): “The impact of incentive compensation on labour productivity in family and nonfamily firms,” Family Business Review 30, 119–136.  Google Scholar
  15. Chrisman, J./Memili, E./Misra, K. (2014): “Nonfamily managers, family firms, and the winner’s curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 38, 1103–1127.  Google Scholar
  16. Eberle, J./Schmucker, A. (2017): “The Establishment History Panel–Redesign and Update 2016,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 237, 535–547.  Google Scholar
  17. Fang, H./Memili, E./Chrisman, J./Penney, C. (2017): “Industry and Information Asymmetry: The Case of the Employment of Non-Family Managers in Small and Medium-Sized Family Firms,” Journal of Small Business Management 55, 632–648.  Google Scholar
  18. Fang, H./Randolph RV, R./Memili, E./Chrisman, J. (2016): “Does size matter? The moderating effects of firm size on the employment of nonfamily managers in privately held family SMEs,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 40, 1017–1039.  Google Scholar
  19. Fischer, G./Janik, F./Müller, D./Schmucker, A. (2008): “The IAB Establishment Panel – From Sample to Survey to Projection,” FDZ Methodenreport 01/2008, Nuremberg.  Google Scholar
  20. Freier, R./Steiner, V. (2010): “Marginal Employment and the Demand for Heterogeneous Labour: Empirical Evidence from a Multi-Factor Labour Demand Model for Germany,” Applied Economics Letters 17, 1177–1182.  Google Scholar
  21. Gómez-Mejía, L./Haynes, K./Núñez-Nickel, M./Jacobson, K./Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007): “Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills,” Administrative Science Quarterly 52, 106–137.  Google Scholar
  22. Groshen, E. (1991): “Five Reasons Why Wages Vary Among Employers,” Industrial Relations 30, 350–381.  Google Scholar
  23. Hamermesh, D. S. (1993): “Labour demand,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.  Google Scholar
  24. Hausman, J. (1978): “Specification tests in econometrics,” Econometrica 46, 1251–1271.  Google Scholar
  25. Jaskiewicz, P./Block, J./Combs, J./Miller, D. (2017): “The effects of founder and family ownership on hired CEOs’ incentives and firm performance,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, 73–103.  Google Scholar
  26. Klein, S. (2000): “Family businesses in Germany: Significance and structure,” Family Business Review 13, 157–182.  Google Scholar
  27. Kölling, A./Schnabel, C. (2021): “Owners, external managers and industrial relations in German establishments,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12623.  Google Scholar
  28. Lichter, A./Peichl, A./Siegloch, S. (2015): “The own-wage elasticity of labour demand: A meta-regression analysis,” European Economic Review 80, 94–119.  Google Scholar
  29. Lindbeck, A./Snower, D. (1986): “Wage setting, unemployment, and insider-outsider relations,” The American Economic Review 76, 235–239.  Google Scholar
  30. Memili, E./Misra, K./Chang, E./Chrisman, J. (2013): “The propensity to use incentive compensation for non-family managers in SME family firms,” Journal of Family Business Management 3, 62–80.  Google Scholar
  31. Milgrom, P./Segal, I. (2002): “Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets,” Econometrica, 70, 583–601.  Google Scholar
  32. Miller, D./Breton-Miller, I. (2006): “Family governance and firm performance: Agency, stewardship, and capabilities,” Family Business Review 19, 73–87.  Google Scholar
  33. Neckebrouck, J./Schulze, W./Zellweger, T. (2017): “Are family firms good employers?” Academy of Management Journal 61, 553–585.  Google Scholar
  34. Oehmichen, J./Sarry, M./Wolff, M. (2014): “Beyond human capital explanations for the gender pay gap among executives: Investigating board embeddedness effects on discrimination,” Business Research 7, 351–380.  Google Scholar
  35. Papke, L./Wooldridge, J. (2008): “Panel Data Methods for Fractional Response Variables with an Application to Test Pass Rates,” Journal of Econometrics 145, 121–133.  Google Scholar
  36. Sraer, D./Thesmar, D. (2007): “Performance and behaviour of family firms: Evidence from the French stock market,” Journal of the European Economic Association 5, 709–751.  Google Scholar
  37. Stiftung Familienunternehmen (2017): “Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Familienunternehmen,” Stuttgart.  Google Scholar
  38. Summers, C. (1996): “Contingent employment in the United States,2 Comparative Labour Law Journal 18, 503–518.  Google Scholar
  39. Tabor, W./Chrisman, J./Madison, K./Vardaman, J. (2018): “Nonfamily members in family firms: A review and future research agenda,” Family Business Review 31, 54–79.  Google Scholar
  40. Wooldridge, J. (2010): “Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data (2nd ed.),” MIT press, Cambridge MA.  Google Scholar
  41. Wooldridge, J. (2019): “Correlated Random Effects Models with Unbalanced Panels,” Journal of Econometrics 211, 137–150.  Google Scholar

Abstract

This paper investigates the characteristics of labor demand for different levels of qualification in family-managed firms. As the majority of firms in Germany but also in other European countries is family-controlled, the outcome of this study is relevant on an international level. While most studies on employment in family firms have focused on the firms’ total workforce, this study analyzes labor demand in family-managed firms on three different skill levels. Applying large panel data from German establishments and a fractional panel probit regression model, the outcomes show that there are some remarkable differences between family- and non-family-managed firms. On average, only medium-skilled workers experienced higher job stability in family-managed firms, whereas highly- and low-skilled workers do not. Highly skilled workers might have valid outside opportunities and probably do not seek higher job stability, while low-skilled probably do not profit from the firm owners’ loyalty.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Arnd Kölling: Labor Demand, Qualifications, and Family Management: Analyzing Labor Demand of German Family-Managed Firms with Panel Data 143
Abstract 143
1. Introduction 143
2. Previous Research and Theory 145
3. Empirical Model and Data 150
4. Results 143
5. Discussion 143
References 143
Supplement 144
I. Derivation of the Empirical Model 144
II. Supplement Tables 144

Contact

Duncker & Humblot GmbH Carl-Heinrich-Becker-Weg 9 12165 Berlin, Deutschland T: +49 30 790006-0

Quick Navigation

2024 Duncker & Humblot GmbH

Powered by CloudPublish

We use cookies to ensure that you get the best experience on our website. Learn more about how we use cookies.