How to Strengthen Fiscal Surveillance Towards a Medium-Term Focus?
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How to Strengthen Fiscal Surveillance Towards a Medium-Term Focus?
Rodríguez, Lucía | Uittenbogaard, Roland | Ramos Carrasco, José Miguel | Segarra, Elena | Oliinyk, Inna | de Groen, Willem Pieter
Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 67 (2021), Iss. 3 : pp. 257–286
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Lucía Rodríguez, Corresponding author. Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF), José Abascal nº 2, 2ª planta 28003 Madrid, Spain.
Roland Uittenbogaard, Dutch Council of State, P.O. Box 20019–2500 EA The Hague, The Netherlands.
José Miguel Ramos Carrasco, Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF), José Abascal nº 2, 2ª planta 28003 Madrid, Spain.
Elena Segarra, Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF), José Abascal nº 2, 2ª planta 28003 Madrid, Spain.
Inna Oliinyk, Secretariat of the Network of EU IFI, Place du Congrès 1, 1000, Brussels, Belgium.
Willem Pieter de Groen, Secretariat of the Network of EU IFI, Place du Congrès 1, 1000, Brussels, Belgium.
References
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Abstract
All EU member states have frameworks with a horizon for fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary calendar. These medium-term frameworks differ across countries both in terms of their set-up and stringency. Against this backdrop, the main objective of this paper is to identify best practices for medium-term targets and their binding nature.
This paper assesses the characteristics and pre-conditions of effective medium-term frameworks in the EU, drawing from national experiences. This contribution is particularly relevant in the context of the Recovery and Resilience Facility since its implementation is expected to result in a significant increase in investment projects over the next three years. Moreover, special attention will be given to the contribution of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) to fiscal discipline. Finally, the paper presents preliminary findings on how to strengthen the medium-term orientation of the budgetary frameworks.
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Lucía Rodríguez et al.: How to Strengthen Fiscal Surveillance Towards a Medium-Term Focus? | 257 | ||
Abstract | 257 | ||
Executive Summary | 258 | ||
Introduction: Medium-Term Fiscal vs. Budgetary Frameworks | 259 | ||
Medium-Term Fiscal Plans in 2014 – 2019: Disciplined, Stable And Predictable Fiscal Policies? | 260 | ||
2014 – 2019: Did Fiscal Policies Deliver on Their Stated Goal? | 262 | ||
2014 – 2019: Stable Fiscal Policies? | 263 | ||
2014 – 2019: Predictable Fiscal Policies? | 269 | ||
The Commission’s MTBF Index and Performance Across Member States | 271 | ||
Medium-Term Frameworks: Legislation vs. Implementation | 274 | ||
There is Often a Gap Between Legislation and Implementation. | 274 | ||
Medium-term Targets are Often Aspirational Rather than Constraining. | 275 | ||
Difficulties in Top-Down Reconciliation Between Fiscal and Budgetary Elements | 276 | ||
What Do Best Performers’ Frameworks Have in Common? | 278 | ||
National Experiences with Medium-Term Fiscal and Budgetary Frameworks | 281 | ||
Conclusions and Preliminary Findings | 283 | ||
References | 284 | ||
Annex 1: A Brief Explanation of the EU Fiscal Framework after the 2011 – 13 Reform | 285 |