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Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?

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Bank, M., Lawrenz, J. Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?. . Some Remarks on the Basel IRB Approach. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 36(4), 534-556. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.534
Bank, Matthias and Lawrenz, Jochen "Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?. Some Remarks on the Basel IRB Approach. " Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 36.4, 2003, 534-556. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.534
Bank, Matthias/Lawrenz, Jochen (2003): Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 36, iss. 4, 534-556, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.534

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Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?

Some Remarks on the Basel IRB Approach

Bank, Matthias | Lawrenz, Jochen

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 36 (2003), Iss. 4 : pp. 534–556

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Matthias Bank, Innsbruck

Jochen Lawrenz, Innsbruck

References

  1. Altman, Edward I. (2001): Credit ratings and the proposed new BIS guidelines on capital adequacy for bank credit assets, Journal Of Banking & Finance (25)1.  Google Scholar
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Abstract

One of the major innovations in the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) is represented by the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach. It can be considered as a conceptually new approach to capital rules, since the IRB risk weight function is derived from a simple portfolio model. A careful analysis of the underlying model reveals, that it is based on a quite complex theoretical background and depends on some critical assumptions. Beside this inherent vagueness of model-based results, the committee shows a politically determined will to calibrate the parameters of the model so as to obtain an economy-wide average of 8% - implying an unchanged level of regulatory capital requirements on average.

Taken together, this suggests that the model-driven approach is more like a pretext to disguise politically determined decisions, and pretend, an accurateness, that is not given. We argue, that if it is the committees aim to provide risk-sensitive capital rules, together with some target level of average capital requirements, this can be achieved much easier. (JEL G21, G28)