Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?
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Why Simple, When it Can Be Difficult?
Some Remarks on the Basel IRB Approach
Bank, Matthias | Lawrenz, Jochen
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 36 (2003), Iss. 4 : pp. 534–556
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Matthias Bank, Innsbruck
Jochen Lawrenz, Innsbruck
Cited By
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Die Diskussion um Prozyklizität versus Risikosensitivität im Basler Konsultationsprozess
Vondra, Klaus
Weiser, Harald
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 39 (2006), Iss. 1 P.75
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.39.1.75 [Citations: 0]
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Abstract
One of the major innovations in the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) is represented by the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach. It can be considered as a conceptually new approach to capital rules, since the IRB risk weight function is derived from a simple portfolio model. A careful analysis of the underlying model reveals, that it is based on a quite complex theoretical background and depends on some critical assumptions. Beside this inherent vagueness of model-based results, the committee shows a politically determined will to calibrate the parameters of the model so as to obtain an economy-wide average of 8% - implying an unchanged level of regulatory capital requirements on average.
Taken together, this suggests that the model-driven approach is more like a pretext to disguise politically determined decisions, and pretend, an accurateness, that is not given. We argue, that if it is the committees aim to provide risk-sensitive capital rules, together with some target level of average capital requirements, this can be achieved much easier. (JEL G21, G28)