EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses
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EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses
Belke, Ansgar | Polleit, Thorsten
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 36 (2003), Iss. 4 : pp. 557–571
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Ansgar Belke, Stuttgart
Thorsten Polleit, Frankfurt/M.
References
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Abstract
The ECB Council Voting Reform: The Question of Political and Economic Mismatch
There is a broad consensus that the enlargement of the euro area necessitates a reform of the voting modalities within the ECB Governing Council. The ECB’s own reform proposal strengthens the voting power of the Executive Board. In addition, it is intended to reduce the discrepancy between the voting share and the economic power of the EMU member countries. However, even under the status quo ante the existing divergence between the political and the economic weights is not aggravated in the wake of an euro area enlargement. Moreover, the discrepancy between GDP weights and voting shares remains huge under the reform. Hence, the principle of representativeness is still violated under the complicated new voting scheme.