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EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses

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Belke, A., Polleit, T. EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 36(4), 557-571. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.557
Belke, Ansgar and Polleit, Thorsten "EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 36.4, 2003, 557-571. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.557
Belke, Ansgar/Polleit, Thorsten (2003): EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 36, iss. 4, 557-571, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.4.557

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EZB-Ratsreform: Zur Frage des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Missverhältnisses

Belke, Ansgar | Polleit, Thorsten

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 36 (2003), Iss. 4 : pp. 557–571

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Article Details

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Ansgar Belke, Stuttgart

Thorsten Polleit, Frankfurt/M.

References

  1. Baldwin, R. E./Berglöf, E./Giavazzi, F./Widgren, M. (2001): Preparing the ECB for Enlargement, CEPR Policy Paper Nr. 6, London.  Google Scholar
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Abstract

The ECB Council Voting Reform: The Question of Political and Economic Mismatch

There is a broad consensus that the enlargement of the euro area necessitates a reform of the voting modalities within the ECB Governing Council. The ECB’s own reform proposal strengthens the voting power of the Executive Board. In addition, it is intended to reduce the discrepancy between the voting share and the economic power of the EMU member countries. However, even under the status quo ante the existing divergence between the political and the economic weights is not aggravated in the wake of an euro area enlargement. Moreover, the discrepancy between GDP weights and voting shares remains huge under the reform. Hence, the principle of representativeness is still violated under the complicated new voting scheme.