JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Konzernbildung, Eigner/Gläubiger-Konflikte und Unterinvestitionsproblematik
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 34 (2001), Iss. 1 : pp. 106–129
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Hans Rau-Bredow, Würzburg
References
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Abstract
Group Building, Shareholder/Creditor Conflicts and the Underinvestment Problem
An underinvestment problem arises where a complementary investment with a positive net present value increases only the market value of debt, but not that of equity. However, shifting the complementary investment and, where appropriate, also other projects to a subsidiary might represent a way out of the dilemma. This contribution analyses the resultant consequences for the market value of equity and of debt because the parent company’s creditors might interpret such shifts as a risk-increasing and, thus, disadvantageous substitution of direct assets for equity. This paper discusses also the implications of the liability a parent company may bear for claims against its subsidiary. This contribution also shows that the problem of overinvestment in projects with a negative cash value might aggravate.