Hedging und Reputationsaufbau auf Terminmärkten
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Hedging und Reputationsaufbau auf Terminmärkten
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 33 (2000), Iss. 1 : pp. 99–136
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Wolfgang Breuer, Bonn
References
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Bessembinder, H. (1991): Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentives and Contracting Effects, in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 26, S. 519 - 532.
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Breeden, D./Viswanathan, S. (1996): Why Do Firms Hedge? An Asymmetric Information Model, unveröffentlichtes Manuskript.
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Breuer, W. (1997): Unternehmerische Investitions- und Finanzierungsentscheidungen bei Verfügbarkeit von Devisenforwardgeschäften, in: Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche von Devisenforwardgeschäften, in: Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Sonderheft 38, 49. Jg., S. 191 - 225.
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Abstract
Hedging and Reputation Building in Forward Markets
The present contribution examines the conditions under which entrepreneurial activities, not noticeable in general, may generate positive welfare effects for the economy as a whole in spite of the existence of potential risk incentive problems and the assumption of general risk neutrality. It would be fair to presume that, in order to prevent their creditworthiness from being ranked lower by potential capital donors as a consequence of insolvency, companies show themselves to be interested in making, wherever possible, hedging transactions in contexts of several periods to reduce for themselves the probability of becoming insolvent. The incentive to a company to build a reputation for itself tends to be stronger in standardised futures markets inter alia than in forward markets where the terms and conditions of contract can be shaped individually. It ought to be mentioned for practical reasons that the present contribution justifies the approach of aligning entrepreneurial risk management measures to a μ-ϕ criterion with μ representing the value of the in-payment surpluses expected to remain after satisfaction of creditors (in a single period), whilst ϕ stands for the individual insolvency risk of companies.