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Hof, F. Glaubwürdigkeit, Zeitinkonsistenz und Zinsdifferenzen in einem System fester Wechselkurse — Ein Kommentar. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 30(4), 552-569. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.4.552
Hof, Franz Xaver "Glaubwürdigkeit, Zeitinkonsistenz und Zinsdifferenzen in einem System fester Wechselkurse — Ein Kommentar" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 30.4, 1997, 552-569. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.4.552
Hof, Franz Xaver (1997): Glaubwürdigkeit, Zeitinkonsistenz und Zinsdifferenzen in einem System fester Wechselkurse — Ein Kommentar, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 30, iss. 4, 552-569, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.4.552

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Glaubwürdigkeit, Zeitinkonsistenz und Zinsdifferenzen in einem System fester Wechselkurse — Ein Kommentar

Hof, Franz Xaver

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30 (1997), Iss. 4 : pp. 552–569

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Franz Xaver Hof, Wien

References

  1. Blanchard, O. and S. Fischer, 1989, Lectures on Macroeconomics, MIT Press.  Google Scholar
  2. Holler, M. J. und G. Illing, 1996, Einführung in die Spieltheorie, 3., verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage, Springer Lehrbuch.  Google Scholar
  3. Jordan, T. J., 1996, Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio, Department of Economics, Harvard University, mimeo.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Credibility, Time Inconsistency and Interest Rate Differences in a Fixed Exchange Rate System - Comment

In Spahn (1996) an attempt was made to apply the Barro-Gordon approach to a small open economy. In this comment it is shown that Spahn’s specification of the Mundell-Fleming model has to be modified and made more precise in order to make consistent interpretations of the model possible. Next, in line with the mainstream literature, Spahn’s model is extended as follows: Firstly, rational expectations are introduced. Secondly, analyzing the one-shot game not only the precommitment solution and the fooling solution, but also the time consistent solution are analyzed. It is shown that the results derived for the small open economy are more complex than those corresponding to the closed economy case provided that the small open economy model is specified correctly. Moreover, these results are unsatisfactory from an empirical point of view. Finally, it is roughly outlined why the analysis of the repeated game would be even more difficult than could be inferred from the verbal sketch by Spahn.