JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Die ECU-Wirtschaft
Ein Modell zu den Konsequenzen der Europäischen Währungsunion
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 25 (1992), Iss. 4 : pp. 469–490
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Heinz-Peter Spahn, Stuttgart-Hohenheim
References
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Google Scholar -
Barro, R. J., 1986: Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion.
Google Scholar -
Economic Journal (Supplement), 96, 23 – 37. -- Dornbusch, R., 1989: Europe 1992 -
Google Scholar -
Macroeconomic Implications. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 341 – 362. -
Google Scholar -
Eichengreen, B., 1990: One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union. Economic Policy, 118 – 166. –
Google Scholar -
Giovannini, A., 1990: European Monetary Reform – Progress and Prospects. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 217 – 274.
Google Scholar -
Wagner, H., 1989: Stabilitätspolitik – Theoretische Grundlagen und institutionelle Alternativen. München/Wien.
Google Scholar -
Weber, A. A., 1991: Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary System. Economic Policy, 58 – 89.
Google Scholar
Abstract
The ECU-Economy – Modelling the Implications of European Currency Union
The consequences of the transition of the EMS into a European Currency Union are analysed by use of a macroeconomic two-country model and a game-theoretic approach as to economic policy decisions. Supply-side distinctions of both countries, modelled by a different path of wage costs, lead to country-specific rates of interest and inflation in the EMS, but result in divergent paths of income and employment in the ECU-system. Although the European Central Bank is equipped with the same utility function as the German Bundesbank inflation and interest rates are higher as compared to the German case. Enduring disparities in the countries’ welfare promote European structural and redistributional policies with questionable results.