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Schönfelder, B. Theorien über Schalterstürme und geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen: Eine kritische Analyse. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 24(4), 508-525. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.4.508
Schönfelder, Bruno "Theorien über Schalterstürme und geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen: Eine kritische Analyse" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 24.4, 1991, 508-525. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.4.508
Schönfelder, Bruno (1991): Theorien über Schalterstürme und geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen: Eine kritische Analyse, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 24, iss. 4, 508-525, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.4.508

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Theorien über Schalterstürme und geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen: Eine kritische Analyse

Schönfelder, Bruno

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 24 (1991), Iss. 4 : pp. 508–525

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Bruno Schönfelder, Rostock

References

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  18. Chari, V. V. (1989): Banking without Deposit Insurance or Bank Panics: Lessons from a Model of the US National Banking System. Quarterly Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 3S. 3-19.  Google Scholar
  19. Chari, V. V.; Jagannathan, R. (1988): Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium. The Journal of Finance 3 S. 749 – 761.  Google Scholar
  20. Cowen, T.; Kroszner, R. (1989): Scottish Banking before 1845: A Model for Lassez-Faire? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2 S. 221 – 231.  Google Scholar
  21. Diamond, D.; Dybvig, P. (1983): Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91: 3 S. 401 -419.  Google Scholar
  22. Dowd, K. (1989): The State and the Monetary System. New York.  Google Scholar
  23. Goodhart, C. (1985): The Evolution of Central Banks. London.  Google Scholar
  24. Gorton, G. (1985): Bank Suspension of Convertibility. Journal of Monetary Economics 15 S. 177 – 193.  Google Scholar
  25. Gorton, G. (1988): Banking Panics and Business Cycles. Oxford Economic Papers 40 S. 751 – 781.  Google Scholar
  26. Hayek, F. A. (1976): Choice in Currency. London.  Google Scholar
  27. Irmler, H. (1976): Bankenkrise und Vollbeschäftigungspolitik (1931 – 36). In Deutsche Bundesbank (Hrsg.): Währung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main.  Google Scholar
  28. Jonung, L. (1990): The Economics of Private Money. Private Bank Notes in Sweden 1831 – 1902. Ekonomiska Forskningsinstitutet vid Hadelshögskolan i Stockholm. Research Report 282.  Google Scholar
  29. Seifert, E. (1984): Privilegierung und Regulierung im Bankwesen. Baden-Baden.  Google Scholar
  30. Selgin, G. (1987): The Theory of Free Banking. Towota N.J.  Google Scholar
  31. Sprague, O.M. (1910): History of Crises under the National Banking System. Washington.  Google Scholar
  32. Wallace, N. (1988): Another Attempt to Explain an Illiquid Banking System: The Diamond and Dybvig Model with Sequential Service taken Seriously. Quarterly Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 3  Google Scholar

Abstract

Bank-Run Theories and Appropriate Defences: A Critical Analysis

Runs on banks play a key role in the reasons given in Justification of the way in which the credit industry is regulated at present. The opposite view is to be found in the literature on free banking which maintains that runs on banks represent a phenomenon caused by regulation in the first place. It is to be regretted that the formal analysis of models capable of explaining runs on banks still leaves much to be desired. The leading model is the one developed by Diamond and Dybvig. It is exemplified that the validity of the analysis presented by those two authors suffers from a major deficiency. The most popular conclusion derived from this analysis, i.e. the view that deposit insurance schemes in particular represent the optimal approach, cannot be maintained. Wallace attempted to remedy this deficiency and, in doing so, pushed the analysis of the structure proposed by Diamond and Dybvig an essential step ahead. Wallace’s findings suggest that a partial stop of payments combined with the threat of a complete stop of payments in the event of deposit withdrawals in excess of a specified upper limit would suffice for preventing bank runs from coming about. This conclusion is corroborated by a number of arguments repeatedly mentioned in the literature on free banking. The most important contribution of this paper is proof to the effect that just a slight change in the model analyzed by Wallace would suffice to make runs on banks possible again. His conclusion that the threat of payment stops would prevent such runs from coming about is little robust therefor. This complies with the experience gained so far which suggests that neither threats nor actual payment stops have been sufficient for preventing runs on banks