Die wirtschaftspolitischen Zielpräferenzen der Deutschen Bundesbank Eine empirische Analyse des Zentralbankverhaltens für die Zeit von 1958 bis 1974
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Die wirtschaftspolitischen Zielpräferenzen der Deutschen Bundesbank Eine empirische Analyse des Zentralbankverhaltens für die Zeit von 1958 bis 1974
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 11 (1978), Iss. 1 : pp. 84–108
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Basler, Hans-Peter
References
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Abstract
In contrast to numerous normative research studies, little has been done so far to elucidate the policy behaviour and the actual objective preferences of the German Bundesbank. Our study counters this lack by means of a positive analysis of Bundesbank behaviour. We proceed from the following consideration: if the German Bundesbank reacts in a systematic manner to objective obstructions, it must be possible to derive from its policy actions information on its objective preferences and its preferred instrument variables. Formally, the policy framework is formulated with the help of an asymmetrical loss function, minimization of which, allowing for structural restrictions, leads to the reaction functions of the German Bundesbank. Then, in the ensuing extraction process, the objective and instrument preferences are obtained from the econometrically estimated reaction coefficients. Our empirical analysis tests the validity of the following hypotheses for the reference period: 1sthypothesis: The German Bundesbank gave priority to price stability in all phases of the cyclical trend. 2nd hypothesis: German monetary policy was constantly involved in a conflict between the requirements of internal and external equilibrium. 3rd hypothesis: The objective preferences of the German Bundesbank were independent of those of the government. In the empirical results we find the 1st and 2nd hypotheses confirmed, while the 3rd hypothesis must be rejected. We assert therefore: in the reference period, the objective preferences of the German Bundesbank were not independent of those of the government. Moreover, Bundesbank behaviour reveals a higher assessment of liquiditypolicy over interest-rate-policy instruments.