Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse
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Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 4 : pp. 615–640
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Muchlinski, Elke
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Épistémologie et probabilité chez Keynes
Muchlinski, Elke
L'Actualité économique, Vol. 79 (2004), Iss. 1-2 P.57
https://doi.org/10.7202/009674ar [Citations: 3]
Abstract
The current debate about the philosophy of Keynes focuses on his perception of probability as the basis of his theory of knowledge und examines its relevance to his economic theory. As a result of a misinterpretation, the term intuition is either interpreted as self-evident without further need of analysis, or attributed to the philosophy of Moore. In my paper, I should like instead to show that, with Keynes, intuition is a constituent part of knowledge, and that his philosophy has its roots not in Moore but in Kant.