Menu Expand

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style

Muchlinski, E. Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 116(4), 615-640. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.615
Muchlinski, Elke "Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 116.4, 1996, 615-640. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.615
Muchlinski, Elke (1996): Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 116, iss. 4, 615-640, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.116.4.615

Format

Die erkenntnistheoretische Position von John Maynard Keynes — Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Kontroverse

Muchlinski, Elke

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 116 (1996), Iss. 4 : pp. 615–640

1 Citations (CrossRef)

Additional Information

Article Details

Muchlinski, Elke

Cited By

  1. Épistémologie et probabilité chez Keynes

    Muchlinski, Elke

    L'Actualité économique, Vol. 79 (2004), Iss. 1-2 P.57

    https://doi.org/10.7202/009674ar [Citations: 3]

Abstract

The current debate about the philosophy of Keynes focuses on his perception of probability as the basis of his theory of knowledge und examines its relevance to his economic theory. As a result of a misinterpretation, the term intuition is either interpreted as self-evident without further need of analysis, or attributed to the philosophy of Moore. In my paper, I should like instead to show that, with Keynes, intuition is a constituent part of knowledge, and that his philosophy has its roots not in Moore but in Kant.