JOURNAL ARTICLE
Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Style
Format
Chairperson Effects in Monetary Policy Shock Identification
Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 68 (2022), Iss. 3 : pp. 191–230
Additional Information
Article Details
Pricing
Author Details
Dan Groft, Ph.D., SEED Center 303, BBC 148, Director of H.C. Drew Center for Business and Economic Analysis, Associate Professor, McNeese State University, 4205 Ryan Street, Lake Charles, LA 70605.
References
-
Caporale, T./Grier, K. (2005): “Inflation, Presidents, Fed Chairs, and Regime Shifts in the U.S. Real Interest Rate,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 37(6), 1153–1163.
Google Scholar -
Clarida, R./Gali, J./Gertler, M. (2000): “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomics Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 147–180.
Google Scholar -
Froyen, R. T./Waud, R. (2002): “The Determinants of Federal Reserve Policy Actions: A Re-Examination,” Journal of Macroeconomics 24(3), 413–428.
Google Scholar -
Groft, D. (2020): Comparing shadow rates in monetary policy shock identification,” Economics Bulletin 40(2), 1781–1796.
Google Scholar -
Hakes, D. (1990): “The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy Under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 22(3), 327–337.
Google Scholar -
Havrilesky, T. (1995): The Pressures on American Monetary Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Google Scholar -
Romer, C./Romer, D. (2004) “A New Measure of Monetary Policy Shocks: Derivations and Implications,” The American Economic Review 94(4), 1055–1084.
Google Scholar -
Wu, J. C./Xia, F. D. (2016) “Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 48(2–3), 253–291.
Google Scholar
Abstract
Monetary policy shocks can come from a variety of sources, including chairpersons of the Federal Reserve. Chairpersons may have different preferences as to which variables to put the most weight on, respond differently to political pressures, or have different personalities affecting the ability to gain consensus among participants. This paper investigates the effects of controlling for changes in chairperson when measuring monetary policy shocks in the Romer and Romer (AER 2004) framework. The results show that different chairpersons are a substantial source of shocks to policy.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dan Groft: Chairperson Effects in Monetary Policy Shock Identification | 191 | ||
| 1. Introduction | 191 | ||
| 2. Data and Interest Rates | 192 | ||
| 3. Results | 197 | ||
| Differential Responses | 197 | ||
| Separate Regressions | 199 | ||
| Investigation of Monetary Policy Shocks | 213 | ||
| Comparison with RR Measure over Meetings | 218 | ||
| Effects on Output and Price | 220 | ||
| 4. Conclusion | 229 | ||
| References | 230 |