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BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated?

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Hennecke, P. BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated?. Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, 99999(), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457607
Hennecke, Peter "BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated?" Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung 99999., 2025, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457607
Hennecke, Peter (2025): BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated?, in: Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. 99999, iss. , 1-15, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457607
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BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated?

Hennecke, Peter

Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. (2025), Online First : pp. 1–15

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457607
Language
English
Pages
15
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Author Details

Peter Hennecke, FOM University of Applied Sciences

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Abstract

Zusammenfassung

Rein quantitativ wirken die fünf ursprünglichen BRICS-Staaten beeindruckend. Sie machen einen substanziellen Teil der Weltbevölkerung, Weltwirtschaft und des Welthandels aus und verfügen über große Militärs. Im Januar 2024 gewann BRICS durch die Aufnahme von vier neuen Mitgliedsstaaten, die auch am jüngsten BRICS-Gipfel in Russland teilnahmen, nochmals an Gewicht. Einige westliche Medien und Politiker reagierten alarmiert. Im September 2024 beantragte auch die Türkei die Mitgliedschaft. Aber können die BRICS-Staaten ihr volles Potential auf der Weltbühne entfalten und das angestrebte Gegengewicht zu westlichen Organisationen bilden? Dieses Papier untersucht systematisch Gemeinsamkeiten, Widersprüche und Konflikte der BRICS-Staaten in verschiedenen Politikbereichen, um letztendlich festzustellen, ob sie über ausreichend gemeinsame Interessen verfügen, um geschlossen zu handeln. Im Ergebnis erscheint es aufgrund der verschiedenen Interessenkonflikte und insbesondere der intensiven Rivalität zwischen Indien und China unwahrscheinlich, dass BRICS in absehbarer Zeit mehr als eine Dialogplattform für seine Mitglieder wird.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Peter Hennecke: BRICS: Overpowered or Overrated? 1
Summary 1
Zusammenfassung 1
1. Introduction 2
2. Policy Areas 3
2.1 Trade 3
2.2 Energy 6
2.3 Finance 6
2.4 Conflicts, Spheres of Influence and Arms Trade 8
3. Summary and Conclusion 10
References 11

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