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Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed

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Kotz, H., Landmann, O. Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed. Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, 2(1), 49-78. https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457606
Kotz, Hans-Helmut and Landmann, Oliver "Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed" Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung 2.1, 2025, 49-78. https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457606
Kotz, Hans-Helmut/Landmann, Oliver (2025): Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed, in: Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. 2, iss. 1, 49-78, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457606
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Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed

Kotz, Hans-Helmut | Landmann, Oliver

Vierteljahreshefte zur Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. 2 (2025), Iss. 1 : pp. 49–78

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/vaw.2025.1457606
Language
German
Pages
30
Keywords

Author Details

Hans-Helmut Kotz, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, SAFE – Leib­niz Institute for Financial Research, Frankfurt, Germany and University of Freiburg

Oliver Landmann, University of Freiburg

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Abstract

Industriepolitische Maßnahmen sind Eingriffe der öffentlichen Hand mit dem Ziel, die sektorale (oder standortbezogene) Struktur einer Wirtschaft zu beeinflussen. Die Behörden können dabei eine Vielzahl von Zielen verfolgen. Mit den zunehmenden geopolitischen Spannungen zwischen den USA und China erlebte die IP einen Aufschwung. Engpässe in den Lieferketten im Zuge der COVID-19-Pandemie verstärkten diesen Trend ebenso wie der Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine. Die Abschwächung der Abhängigkeitsrisiken und die Erlangung strategischer Autonomie wurden zu einer politischen Priorität (‚nearshoring‘, ‚friendshoring‘). Auch wenn ihr Einsatz typischerweise abgelehnt wird, wurde immer wieder auf IP zurückgegriffen. Oft in defensiver Weise, um Unternehmen zu schützen, die durch den internationalen Wettbewerb herausgefordert wurden. Aber auch vorausschauend, um Innovationen zu fördern, aufbauend auf Grundlagenforschung und F&E, um den technologischen Wandel zu lenken. Externe Effekte, die einen Keil zwischen private und gesellschaftliche Werte treiben und zu einer Unterversorgung mit Gütern oder einer Überbeanspruchung von Ressourcen führen, waren die Standardbegründung für industriepolitische Eingriffe. Darüber hinaus wurden handels- und wettbewerbsbezogene Argumente verwendet, um politische Interventionen allokativer Art zu verteidigen (junge Industrien und steile Lernkurven, Airbus vs. Boeing). Umverteilungsversionen von IP unterstützen zurückgebliebene Regionen oder Industrien im Niedergang. Die nationale Sicherheit (Geopolitik) wurde in jüngster Zeit erneut zu einer wichtigen Triebkraft für geistiges Eigentum (US CHIPS und Science Act). IP wird in einer Vielzahl von nationalen Formen umgesetzt.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Hans-Helmut Kotz / Oliver Landmann: Industrial Policy: Always Dismissed, Always Deployed 49
Zusammenfassung 49
1. Introduction: Reemergence of a Policy Approach 50
2. Industrial Policy – Concept and Scope 54
2.1 The Analytical Core of Industrial Policy: Market Failures 55
2.2 Industrial Policy and International Trade 56
2.3 The Geopolitics of Industrial Policy 57
2.4 Industrial Policy and National Security 58
2.5 Industrial Policy and Competition 60
2.6 The Political Economy of Industrial Policy 61
3. Applied Industrial Policy – National and Sectoral Cases 63
3.1 Industrial Policy in the U.S. 63
3.2 Industrial Policy in France 64
3.3 Greening the Economy 65
3.4 The Case of E-Mobility 66
3.5 Performance Assessment 68
4. What Now For Europe? Lessons To Be Drawn 69
4.1 Industrial Policy and Economic Growth 69
4.2 Innovation Policies: A Trade-Off Between Risk and Return? 71
4.3 The Need For More Europe – When It Is About European Public Goods 72
References 75

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