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Prettenthaler, F. Catastrophic Risk and Egalitarian Principles for Risk Transfer Mechanisms. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 128(4), 549-560. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.128.4.549
Prettenthaler, Franz E. "Catastrophic Risk and Egalitarian Principles for Risk Transfer Mechanisms" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 128.4, 2008, 549-560. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.128.4.549
Prettenthaler, Franz E. (2008): Catastrophic Risk and Egalitarian Principles for Risk Transfer Mechanisms, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 128, iss. 4, 549-560, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.128.4.549

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Catastrophic Risk and Egalitarian Principles for Risk Transfer Mechanisms

Prettenthaler, Franz E.

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 128 (2008), Iss. 4 : pp. 549–560

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Author Details

Franz E. Prettenthaler, Joanneum Research Forschungsgesellschaft mbH, Institut für Technologie- und Regionalpolitik (InTeReg), Elisabethstraße 20, A-8010 Graz, Austria.

Cited By

  1. ‘Weather Value at Risk’: A uniform approach to describe and compare sectoral income risks from climate change

    Prettenthaler, Franz

    Köberl, Judith

    Bird, David Neil

    Science of The Total Environment, Vol. 543 (2016), Iss. P.1010

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.04.035 [Citations: 17]

Abstract

Financial aid for the worst off victims of earthquakes and other catastrophes seems tobe a morally unquestioned principle for the allocation of public funds. This paper shows however, that this principle is ambiguous if the decision is viewed as a dynamic choice problem where such resources need to be allocated in two periods: before and after the event takes place (before and after uncertainty is resolved). The literature on social choice suggests that utilitarian principles fare better in such situations. This paper provides a uniform formal framework to relate one such result, namely a multi-profile version of Harsanyis 1955 theorem by Mongin (1994) to another one by Myerson (1981), stated in a somewhat unconventional social choice framework. It shows that the Linearity condition, that is met only by welfare functions of the utilitarian type, has a natural interpretation in terms of an equivalence of ex ante and ex post evaluation, a concept that is related to but not equivalent with dynamic consistency.