Umberto Eco’s Theory of Interpretation as Textual Cooperation: Application to Legal Interpretation
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Umberto Eco’s Theory of Interpretation as Textual Cooperation: Application to Legal Interpretation
Rechtstheorie, Vol. 48 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 393–415
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Dr. Liina Reisberg, University of Tartu, School of Law, Näituse 20, 50409, Tartu, Estonia
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YAZARIN HAKLARINDAN METNİN HAKLARINA: YAPIT OLARAK HUKUK VE YORUMU
İŞSEVENLER, Osman Vahdet
Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 72 (2023), Iss. 2 P.547
https://doi.org/10.33629/auhfd.1221422 [Citations: 0]
Abstract
German scholars make a distinction between the subjective theory of legal interpretation (to get to know the legislator's will) and the objective theory of legal interpretation (to get to know the meaning of law), used in combination in legal practice.81 When finding a place for Eco's theory between them, it should be emphasised that Eco's model analyses not the intentions of the author, but the directives of the text. Text as a generative scheme and a syntactic-semantic-pragmatic grasp82 of its internal structures determines its interpretation. Accordingly, the law directs its reader. The model Reader is thus inscribed in the text.
As introduced in a practical way in the current article, at all levels of actualised content – discursive, narrative, actantial and ideological – the peculiarity of law text is that the Model Reader is helped to actualise the right structures, stimulated by the author (legislature). The reader's ability to recognise codes and subcodes, to actualise the narrative structures of fabula, topic and frames, and the capacity to recognise ideological structures is directed by the text at all levels.
Knowing this, and keeping it in mind, helps lawyers to interpret laws with maximum adherence to the text. Therefore it is possible that, in parallel to traditional interpretative canons, lawyers to try to take into account Eco's schema, which reminds them of their duty to be led by the text. The central question for juridical interpretation – uniformity – is assured by the ability of a text to create its Model Reader's competence. This is why the outcome should be more in accordance with the rule of law. Legal interpretation is, as a practical matter, an act of power83 and therefore should not be totally unconstrained. Eco's semiotic theory reminds us that each norm, in a similar way to a sign, contains a set of instructions84 for interpretation. These aspects of cooperation between the author and the reader – textual strategy that leads to partnership between the reader and the author85– consolidate the rule of law in interpretation of law-texts, a key point made by Umberto Eco.
Turning back to the starting point concentrating particularly on the research potential of law and literature, I agree with Dunlop, who has suggested that research ‘about’ law will inevitably address much bigger questions than research ‘in’ law.86 It may be that the strongest benefit of Eco's interpretive account is highlighting totally different aspects as juridical interpretative theory. Differentiating discursive, narrative, actantial and ideological levels in law and finding a set of instructions from each of these levels makes the peculiarities of legal texts evident. At the same time finding meaning in a text in methodologically different ways helps to broaden the view of lawyers and may therefore have a self-reflectory as well as educative effect.