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Probabilism in Legal Interpretation
In: Law in Times of Crisis (2024), pp. 163–185
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Alex Stein
Stein, Alex, Justice Prof. Dr., Supreme Court of Israel, Jerusalem, Israel
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Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Alex Stein: Probabilism in Legal Interpretation | 163 | ||
I. Theories of Interpretation | 163 | ||
II. Introducing Probabilism | 167 | ||
1. Standard of Proof | 169 | ||
2. Tie-Breakers | 172 | ||
3. Language, “Family Resemblances” and Other Evidence | 174 | ||
III. Probabilism and Bostock | 177 | ||
IV. Conclusion | 182 | ||
Bibliography | 183 |