Handelsbeschränkungen und „finanzielle Protektion“
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Handelsbeschränkungen und „finanzielle Protektion“
Zur sektoralen Struktur von Finanzmarktregulierungen am Beispiel Brasilien und Peru
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 25 (1992), Iss. 4 : pp. 528–544
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Markus Diehl, Kiel
References
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Amelung, T. (1989), The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach; in: KYKLOS, Vol. 42, S. 515 - 532.
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Amelung, T. and Sell, F. L. (1989), On the Redundancy of Redundant Tariffs. University of Giessen, faculty of economics. Discussion papers in development economics No. 7.
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Anderson, K. and Baldwin, R. E. (1981), The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries: Empirical Evidence. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 492. Washington, D.C.
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Becker, G. S. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influences; in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 48, (S. 371 - 400).
Google Scholar -
Amelung, T. (1989), The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach; in: KYKLOS, Vol. 42, S. 515 – 532.
Google Scholar -
Amelung, T. and Sell, F. L. (1989), On the Redundancy of Redundant Tariffs. University of Giessen, faculty of economics. Discussion papers in development economics No. 7.
Google Scholar -
Anderson, K. and Baldwin, R. E. (1981), The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries: Empirical Evidence. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 492. Washington, D.C.
Google Scholar -
Becker, G. S. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influences; in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 48, (S. 371 – 400).
Google Scholar
Abstract
Trade Restrictions and "Financial Protection" – The Sectoral Structure of Financial Market Regulations Demonstrated by the Brazilian and Peruvian Examples
In many countries distortions through the foreign trade regime are accompanied by regulations of the financial sector, which may also benefit particular economic sectors. In order to analyse possible causal relations, this paper develops a method to measure the degree of protection in financial markets. Decisions in corporate finance can be simulated on industry level under (hypothetical) undistorted capital market conditions. The difference to the observed capital structure may then be interpreted as the outcome of governmental regulation. Empirical analysis for the case of longterm bank credits in Brazil and Peru lend some support to the hypotheses, that there is parallel influence on trade policy and financial market regulations in Brazil in contrast to compensatory influence in Peru.